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LOCHNER, PARITY, AND THE CHINESE LAUNDRY CASES
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN
From the 1860s to the early twentieth century, Chinese laun-
drymen throughout the American West suffered from violence,
boycotts, and hostile regulation of their occupation by local gov-
ernments. The vast majority of Chinese laundrymen were not
permitted to vote because they were aliens ineligible for citizen-
ship. The laundrymen therefore could not effectively defend
themselves against hostile legislation in the political arena.
They did, however, challenge dozens of laundry ordinances in
court. This Article reviews the cases brought by the laundrymen
and examines some of the lessons the cases teach.
Part I of this Article discusses the historical background of the
legal battles over Chinese laundries. Anti-Chinese laundry legis-
lation arose out of a broader, popular anti-Chinese movement in
the American West. As the Chinese became increasingly promi-
nent in the laundry industry, anti-Chinese forces inevitably
targeted Chinese laundries.
Part II discusses anti-Chinese laundry legislation promulgated
in California, Montana, Oregon, and elsewhere in the West.
Part II also examines the legal challenges brought by the Chi-
nese to such legislation. Anti-Chinese laundry laws generally
took one of four forms: licensing legislation, maximum hours
laws, zoning ordinances, and taxation. These laws almost never
discriminated against the Chinese explicitly. Nevertheless, such
laws were passed in order to shut down Chinese laundries, or at
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least to give white competitors an advantage over Chinese laun-
drymen.
State courts faced with challenges to laundry regulations
brought by Chinese laundrymen generally upheld the laws.
Federal courts, however, usually invalidated them. The courts
that ruled against the Chinese found that the states' police pow-
er had a broad scope. The courts that ruled in favor of the laun-
drymen, meanwhile, typically held that the measures in ques-
tion were not within the scope of the police power and that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected the right to earn a livelihood
free from unreasonable government interference. Some of the
latter opinions preceded the infamous Lochner v. New York' case
by decades, but anticipated Lochner's reasoning and rhetoric.
Professor Burt Neuborne's controversial article, The Myth of
Parity, argues that federal courts are more likely to protect
federal constitutional rights from hostile local majoritarian sen-
timent than are state courts.2 Part III of this Article shows that
the history of the anti-Chinese laundry laws provides evidence
consistent with Neuborne's thesis.
Part IV of this Article argues that the history of the anti-
Chinese laundry laws lends support to revisionist accounts of
the origins and effects of Lochnerian jurisprudence.3 Tradition-
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1124 (1977)
[hereinafter Neuborne, The Myth of Parity]; see also Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited:
The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 797 (1995)
[hereinafter Neuborne, Parity Revisited].
3. Throughout this Article, the phrases "Lochnerian" or "Lochnerian jurispru-
dence" are used to refer to the liberty-of-contract jurisprudence associated with the
Lochner Era, instead of the more common "substantive due process" or "laissez-faire
jurisprudence." The phrase "substantive due process" is anachronistic; it was never
used by Lochnerian judges, or for that matter, by their opponents. See Gary D.
Rowe, The Legacy of Lochner. Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
221, 244 (1999); see also James W. Ely, Jr., Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley,
Property Rights, and Race, 51 VAND. L. REV. 953, 956 (1998). The phrase has no
known use before the early 1930s, see G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due
Process and Holmes's Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 108 (1997), and only
caught on years later as a pejorative oxymoron used by opponents of Lochnerism,
and, later, opponents of the Warren court, see Rowe, supra, at 244-45. The phrase
"laissez-faire jurisprudence," meanwhile, is a misnomer. While Lochner-Era courts
sometimes invalidated economic regulations, they never attempted to institute a
regime remotely approaching the sort of Nozickian night watchman state normally
212 [Vol. 41:211
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ally, constitutional scholars and historians have argued that by
protecting economic rights fromA "progressive" legislation, post-
Reconstruction courts protected the rich and powerful at the ex-
pense of the poor and helpless.4 Moreover, this effect was pur-
portedly intentional. A recent review essay explains that
"[pirogressive historians and New Deal constitutionalists have
portrayed the jurisprudence of economic regulation from Recon-
struction to 1937 as if it were designed to do little more than
meet the needs of the Carnegies and Morgans at the expense of
the people."5 In particular, decisions invalidating labor laws on
constitutional grounds, including the Lochner decision itself,
have traditionally been seen as irredeemably reactionary. To
the extent that Lochnerian judges believed that invalidation of
pro-union and other progressive legislation protected the public
from special interest legislation, this is seen as evidence that the
legal elite was blind to economic and social realities that neces-
sitated government intervention to ensure that labor markets
functioned properly and to redress inequalities of bargaining
power.6
The traditional view, as expressed above, is based on the
implicit assumption that market outcomes were unfair to all but
wealthy and corporate interests, who benefitted at the expense
of the rest of society, while government regulation benefitted the
public at large, especially "workers." Given consistently rising
standards of living for workers during the heyday of American
capitalism, when government iupport for labor unions was mini-
mal,7 the -roots of this belief are obscure. Moreover, as elemen-
associated with the phrase "laissez-faire." See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF
EVERY OTHER RIGHT-. A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 103-04 (2d.
ed. 1998).
4. See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF
ENTERPRISE 84 (1951); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 568 (2d ed.
1988); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Leg-
islation in the Progressive Era, 1983 SUP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y Y.B. 53, 58.
5. Rowe, supra note 3, at 222.
6. See TRIBE, supra note 4, at 586 n.37 ("What was wrong was simply that, as a
picture of freedom in industrial society, the one painted by the Justices badly dis-
torted the character and needs of the human condition and the reality of the eco-
nomic situation.").
7. See F.A. HARPER, WHY WAGES RISE 13 (1957); see also HENRY HAZLrIT, Eco-
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tary public choice economics suggests, because the wealthy as a
class faced no fundamental disadvantages in the political mar-
ket, there is no a priori reason to believe that economic regula-
tions worked systematically to their disadvantage, nor has such
disadvantage been demonstrated empirically.8
Indeed, public choice suggests that politicians often supply
legislation to meet the demands of important voter constituen-"
cies, rather than to serve the interests of a public at large.9 To
put it another way, legislation tends to benefit those with politi-
cal power at the expense of those who lack it. Several revision-
ist scholars have shown that the public at large-which faces
severe coordination and information problems in opposing "class
legislation" benefitting powerful interest groups-gained from
the invalidation by Lochnerian courts of legislation that assisted
special interests at the public's expense."0
Meanwhile, this author, along with a few other revisionist
scholars, have started to document the negative effects of facial-
ly neutral regulatory legislation on racial minorities, particularly
African Americans. From the 1890s on, African Americans in the
NOMICS IN ONE LESSON 104 (2d ed. 1962); BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LiBERTIES
AND THE CONSTITUTION 125 (1980) (noting improvement of the standard of living in
the United States between the Civil War and World War I, despite "relatively few
welfare laws and unions"). For international comparisons, see E.H. PHELPS BROWN
& MARGARET H. BROWNE, A CENTURY OF PAY (1968); E.H. PHELPS BROWN, PAY AND
PROFrrS (1968).
8. In fact, the scholarly literature provides many examples of regulatory capture,
where the established companies in an industry used the regulatory process to their
advantage.
9. See Gary S. Becker, Pressure Groups and Political Behavior, in CAPITALISM
AND DEMOCRACY: SCHUMPETER REVISITED 120, 124 (Richard D. Coe & Charles K.
Wilber eds., 1985).
10. See SIEGAN, supra note 7, at 124-25; James W. Ely, Jr., Melville W. Fuller
Reconsidered, 1998 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 32, 46; Norman Karlin, Back to the Future:
From Nollan to Lochner, 17 SW. U. L. REV. 627, 668-70 (1988); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and
Margarine, 77 CAL. L REV. 83, 128-29 (1989); Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of
Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397, 400-28; Keith Poole & Howard
Rosenthal, The Enduring Nineteenth Century Battle for Economic Regulation: The
Interstate Commerce Act Revisited, 36 J.L. & ECON. 837 (1993); Christopher T.
Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, 11 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 91, 95-96 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice, Public Opinion, and
the Fuller Court, 49 VAND. L. REV. 373, 385-86 (1996) (reviewing JAMES W. ELY, JR.,
THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910 (1995)).
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South faced a fundamental obstacle to success in the political
process: they were largely disenfranchised.
Legal scholars have traditionally paid little attention to how
regulatory legislation impacted racial minorities, perhaps be-
cause they assume that discriminatory social norms can develop
and be sustained in a free market economy, even in the absence
of reinforcing state action." Yet modern political economy, par-
ticularly public choice theory, challenges the wisdom of down-
playing the role of state regulation, including facially neutral
regulations, in enforcing discriminatory norms.'
In a series of articles, this author has investigated negative
effects of facially neutral labor and zoning regulations on African
American welfare. 13 Consistent with public choice intuitions,
11. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1065-85 (1995).
12. As Mancur Olson's classic work The Logic of Collective Action explains, large,
diffuse interest groups have trouble enforcing mutually desired norms in the absence
of coercion. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). In
other words, it is very difficult for a cartel, including a cartel of racist whites, to
operate effectively unless the government intervenes on its behalf. As Robert Cooter
explains, "discriminatory social groups suffer the same problems of instability as any
other cartel. To sustain discriminatory norms, evaders must be punished by a com-
bination of informal sanctions and formal laws." Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative
Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 156 (1994).
The role violence, often implicitly or explicitly endorsed by government, tradi-
tionally played in suppressing racial minorities in the United States has also not
received sufficient attention from legal historians.
13. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, The Davis-Bacon Act: Vestige of Jim Crow, 13
NAT'L BLACK L.J. 276 (1994) [hereinafter Bernstein, The Davis-Bacon Act]; David E.
Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Mi-
gration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781 (1998) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Law and Economics]; David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of
the Use of Government Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 89 (1994) [hereinafter Bernstein, Licensing Laws]; David E. Bernstein, Philip
Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51
VAND. L. REV. 797 (1998) [hereinafter Bernstein, Philip Sober]; David E. Bernstein,
Roots of the 'Underclass': The Decline of Laissez-faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of
Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85 (1993) [hereinafter Bernstein, Rise of
the "Underclass"]; David E. Bernstein, The Shameful, Wasteful History of New York's
Prevailing Wage Law, 7 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTs. L.J. 1 (1997) [hereinafter
Bernstein, History of New York's Prevailing Wage Law]; David E. Bernstein, Note,
The Supreme Court and "Civil Rights," 1886-1908, 100 YALE L.J. 725 (1990). Sever-
al other scholars similarly have investigated the negative effects of facially neutral
labor and zoning regulations on African American welfare. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIINATION
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these laws at best failed to take the interests of African Ameri-
cans into account, and at worst were intentionally used to ex-
clude them from relevant markets. Lochnerian decisions invali-
dating these regulations had positive effects on African Ameri-
can welfare, while decisions deferring to the government's regu-
latory power were disastrous for African Americans.' 4
Like African Americans in the South, Chinese residents of the
United States were unable to vote. Facially neutral regulation
that affected the Chinese therefore provide another opportunity
to test the intuition that regulatory legislation, even purportedly
progressive legislation, often served to harm politically vulnera-
ble groups, either intentionally, or because the interests of the
disenfranchised groups were not taken into account in the politi-
cal process. Concomitantly, one can use the history of the laun-
dry laws to test the thesis that Lochnerian jurisprudence invali-
dating regulations that interfered with liberty of contract helped
such groups.
As discussed in detail below, this Article documents how cate-
gories of legislation traditionally seen as "progressive," including
maximum hours, zoning, and licensing laws, sometimes served
as subterfuges for intentionally discriminatory policy. Mean-
while, courts that chose to incorporate Lochnerian reasoning
into their Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence protected Chi-
nese laundrymen from legislation that intentionally discriminat-
ed against them, even when the discrimination was neither
obvious nor proven at trial, and also protected them from legis-
lation that was not intentionally discriminatory, but had severe
and disproportionate negative consequences for the laundrymen.
Lochnerism, then, rather than being irrelevant or even hostile to
LAWS 91-115 (1992); Ely, supra note 3, at 953-73; Richard A. Epstein, Lest We For-
get: Buchanan v. Warley and Constitutional Jurisprudence in the 'Progressive Era,"
51 VAND. L. REV. 787 (1998); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Sub-
stantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379, 390 (1988); Karlin, supra note 10, at
640-47; Jennifer Roback, Rules v. Discretion: Berea College v. Kentucky, 20 INVL J.
GROUP TENSIONS 47, 51 (1990).
14. The role of labor regulations in harming African Americans is discussed in
further detail in the author's forthcoming manuscript from Duke University Press,
tentatively entitled ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: LABOR REGULATIONS, AFRICAN-
AMERICANS AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (forthcoming
2000).
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the concerns of politically powerless Chinese laundrymen, as the
traditional view would suggest, was crucial to their protection.
I. CHINESE LAUNDRIES: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Chinese immigrants began to establish laundries in San Fran-
cisco around 1848, at the start of the Gold Rush.'5 As in other
Western boom towns, the population of San Francisco was
disproportionately male. 6 Laundering, however, was considered
women's work, unfit for a white man.'7 Before the Chinese ar-
rived, a few Spanish-American and Native American women
engaged in the laundry business in "Washerwomen's Lagoon."18
When the Gold Rush brought thousands of single men to San
Francisco, the washerwomen began to charge extremely high
fees; it was "almost cheaper to discard [a shirt] and buy a new
one" than to launder it.' 9 Some San Franciscans even sent their
laundry to Canton, China, or Hong Kong, where foreign laun-
dries laundered shirts for twelve dollars a dozen and then re-
turned them weeks, or even months, later.2 ° Chinese residents of
Hawaii soon recognized their geographic advantage and entered
into the laundry business, charging eight dollars a dozen.2"
Lured initially by gold fever, a few Chinese immigrants to the
United States established local laundries. By 1850, with the
arrival of Chinese competition, the price for washing shirts fell
to five dollars a dozen.2
Although a few Chinese immigrants to the United States
pioneered Chinese involvement in the laundry industry, most
15. See Paul Ong, An Ethnic Trade: The Chinese Laundries in Early California, J.
ETHNIC STUD., Fall 1981, at 95, 96.
16. See A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA: A SYLLABUS 63 (Thomas W.
Chinn ed., 1969) [hereinafter A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA].
17. See Alexander Yamato, Racial Antagonism and the Formation of Segmented
Labor Markets: Japanese Americans and Their Exclusion from the Workforce, 20
HUmBOLDT J. SOC. REL. 31, 42 (1994).
18. A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 16, at 63.
19. Id.
20. See AIEANDER MCLEOD, PIGTAILS AND GOLD DUST 111 (1947); SYLVIA SUN
MINNICI, SAMFOW: THE SAN JOAQUIN CHINESE LEGACY 143 (1988).
21. See MINNICK, supra note 20, at 143.
22. See A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 16, at 63.
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prospected for gold.23 Many of these Chinese met with a great
deal of initial success.24 Their good news reached home, and
Chinese immigration to the United States soared from 2176 in
1851 to 20,026 in 1852.5
Hostility among white miners to Chinese competitors grew
substantially with the Chinese immigration boom of 1852. As
the Chinese arrived, false rumors spread among white miners
that the Chinese immigrants to the United States were "coo-
lies."21 7 Chinese coolie labor was a system that exchanged inden-
tured labor for minimal wages and passage loans to Latin Amer-
ica.28 Employers treated coolies poorly, often worse than slaves,
because the coolies' employers had no economic interest in the
coolies' long-term health.29
In fact, Chinese immigrants to the United States were not
indentured coolies. Their contracts for passage loans to North
America required a monetary repayment, not a servile one.30
Their economic situation was no different from that of white
forty-niners who borrowed money to finance their journey to the
West. Nevertheless, most white workers believed the coolie myth
and were upset and angry at the prospect of having to compete
with malnourished coolie laborers.31 For decades, the coolie myth
legitimized legislation that discriminated against Chinese immi-
grants.
32
23. See MARY ROBERTS COOLIDGE, CHINESE IMMIGRATION 16-17 (1909).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 498.
26. See Terry Boswell, A Split Labor Market Analysis of Discrimination Against
Chinese Immigrants, 1850-1882, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 352, 356 (1986).
27. Id. at 358.
28. See id.
29. See LUCILLE EAVES, A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA LABOR LEGISLATION 106-07
(1910); Boswell, supra note 26, at 358 n.7.
30. See COOLIDGE, supra note 23, at 45-46; GEORGE F. SEWARD, CHINESE IMIrvGRA-
TION: ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMICAL ASPECTS 136-58 (1881); RONALD TAKAKI, STRANG-
ERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 35-36 (1989);
Boswell, supra note 26, at 358.
31. See Boswell, supra note 26, at 357.
32. See id. at 359; Margaret Kolb Holden, The Rise and Fall of Oregon Populism:
Legal Theory, Political Culture and Public Policy, 1868-1895, at 369 (1993) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with Alderman Library at
the University of Virginia).
218 [Vol. 41:211
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Anti-Chinese sentiment developed out of broader anti-immi-
grant feelings among miners. Within months of the start of the
Gold Rush, white miners persuaded the legislature to institute a
twenty dollar per month tax on foreign miners in order to drive
out competition from Mexicans and other Latin Americans.s
This tax was repealed in 1851, just prior to the wave of Chinese
migration.3
In response to the influx of Chinese, white miners agitated for
a new tax on foreign miners that would discourage this new
source of competition." California legislators responded by levy-
ing a three dollar per month tax on all foreign miners.3 6 The
state later increased this tax and eventually amended it so that
it applied only to the Chinese.7 The tax was high enough to
create a substantial revenue stream for the state, but not so
high as to force all Chinese out of the mines.8
Besides engaging in political activism, white miners reacted to
the influx of Chinese competitors with violence. The violence
became especially serious during a recession caused by a decline
in gold prices between 1853 and 1854.s9 Many Chinese left the
33. See COOLIDGE, supra note 23, at 29-30; EAVES, supra note 29, at 111.
34. See COOLIDGE, supra note 23, at 30.
35. See id at 29-31.
36. See id. at 32.
37. See Act of May 4, 1852, ch. 37, §§ 1, 6-10, 1852 Cal. Stat. 84, 84-86 (repealed
1853); Boswell, supra note 26, at 359. The tax was raised by a dollar in 1853, and
for the first time the Chinese were clearly the major target of the law. See Act of
March 30, 1853, ch. 44, § 6, 1853 Cal. Stat. 62, 63 (repealed 1939); COOLIDGE, supra
note 23, at 31-33. A new version of the law, passed in 1861, required that all for-
eigners residing in mining districts who were not eligible for citizenship (that is, the
Chinese) would be required to pay the tax. See Act of May 17, 1861, ch. 401, § 93,
1861 Cal. Stat. 419, 448-49; COOLIDGE, supra note 23, at 35. The law ceased to be
enforced after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. See COOLIDGE, supra
note 23, at 36. Chinese immigrants ultimately paid approximately 85% of all of the
revenue collected from the tax. See Priscilla S. Wegars, The History and Archaeology
of the Chinese in Northern Idaho, 1880 Through 1910, at 32-33 (1991) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Idaho) (on file with the University of Idaho Li-
brary).
The Oregon Constitution banned the Chinese from owning mining claims or
land. See OR. CONST. of 1860, art. II, § 6; art. XV, § 8.
38. See COOLIDGE, supra note 23, at 33.
39. See PING CHIU, CHINESE LABOR IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1880: AN ECONOMIC
STUDY 16-22 (1963); COOLIDGE, supra note 23, at 255-56; RICHARD E. LINGENFELTER,
THE HARD ROCK MINERS: A HISTORY OF THE MINING LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE
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mines because of the foreign miners' tax and anti-Chinese vio-
lence.40 In the ensuing decades, legal harassment and violence
followed Chinese miners throughout the West.4
As opportunities in the mines diminished, some Chinese,
recognizing the demand among white miners for laundry service,
set up wash houses just outside mining camps.' Other Chinese
established laundries in San Francisco, or in other cities in Cali-
fornia and throughout the West.' Chinese immigrants rarely
came to the United States with experience as launderers.4' In
China, like America, laundering was considered women's work.4 5
Some Chinese who established laundries learned the trade
through apprenticeships, while others gained laundering skills
while working as house servants.46
Despite their initial lack of laundering skills, the laundry
business appealed to Chinese immigrants. Laundry ownership
did not require proficiency in English or a large capital invest-
ment-an ample water supply and a shack with a stove usually
sufficed.47 Many Chinese opened laundries in partnership, fur-
AMERICAN WEST 1863-1893, at 107 (1974); ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE
ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHnESE MOVEmENT IN CALIFORNIA 50 (1971).
40. See COOLIDGE, supra note 23, at 38. Nevertheless, as late as 1870, 27% of the
Chinese in the United States were miners, and they constituted 11.2% of the miners
in the United States, as well as 27.5% of those in the West. See Wegars, supra note
37, at 29-30.
41. See, e.g., State v. Owsley, 42 P. 105, 107 (Mont. 1895) (upholding "poll tax"
targeted at Chinese mine workers); Tibbitts v. Ab Tong, 2 P. 759, 764-65 (Mont.
1882) (denying the right of Chinese immigrants to own mining property); Territory v.
Lee, 2 Mont. 124, 144 (1874) (declaring law requiring aliens to forfeit ownership of
placer mines to be unconstitutional); LINGENFELTER, supra note 39, at 109-19 (de-
scribing anti-Chinese violence in Nevada in the late 1860s).
42. See PAUL C.P. SIU, THE CHINESE I.IAUNDRYMAN: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ISOLATION
52-53 (1987); Boswell, supra note 26, at 364; Fern C. Trull, The History of the Chi-
nese in Idaho from 1864-1910, at 17 (1946) (unpublished M.A thesis, University of
Oregon) (on file with the University of Oregon Library).
43. City laundries offered their owners two advantages over mining camp laun-
dries. First, it was easy to find a purchaser once the original owner decided to re-
turn to China. See Ong, supra note 15, at 95-96. Second, other Chinese workers
were readily available to run the laundry while the owner took a trip to China or
elsewhere. See id Laundrymen in rural areas who had partners also were able to
visit China. See Florence C. Lister & Robert H. Lister, Chinese Sojourners in Territo-
rial Prescott, 31 J. Sw. 1, 17 (1989).
44. See SIU, supra note 42, at 107.
45. See Lister & Lister, supra note 43, at 21.
46. See SIU, supra note 42, at 52-53.
47. See TAKAKI, supra note 30, at 93; John Gioia, A Social, Political and Legal
220
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ther reducing the risk of capital loss." Additionally, many Chi-
nese opened laundries because owning a business was a status
symbol in the American Chinese community and in the
immigrant's home village, to which the laundry owner generally
planned to return.49 The laundry business was also attractive
because it did not initially raise the competitive ire of whites; 0
few white women and even fewer men wanted to work as laun-
derers.5 A well-organized guild system allowed the laundrymen
to set common prices,52 allocate markets," and create a job
training and unemployment system.'M Violation of guild rules by
a member or an attempt by an upstart to work outside of the
guild was met with economic retaliation or, if necessary, vio-
lence.5 5 Once Chinese laundrymen became established, they
rapidly brought their relatives into the business.56 By 1860, most
laundry workers in California were Chinese.57
Study of Tick Wo v. Hopkins, in TiE CHINESE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: PAPERS FROM
THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CHINESE AMERICAN STUDIES 211, 212 (Genny
Lim ed., 1980); Rose Hum Lee, Occupational Invasion, Succession, and Accommoda-
tion of the Chinese of Butte, Montana, 55 AM. J. SOC. 50, 53 (1949); Daniel
Liestman, The Chinese in the Black Hills, 1876.1932, 27 J.W. 74, 76 (1988); Lister &
Lister, supra note 43, at 15; Li-hua Yu, Chinese Immigrants in Idaho 113 (1991)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bowling Green State University) (on file with the
University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) Library).
48. See Lister & Lister, supra note 43, at 17. Most partners were related by clan
or village. See id.
49. See Lee, supra note 47, at 53; Lister & Lister, supra note 43, at 17.
50. See Ong, supra note 15, at 101. Idaho laundrymen did not have a formal
guild, but they fixed prices nevertheless. There was also sufficient cooperation among
the Idaho laundrymen that they never seemed to locate in the same area of a city
or have any dispute over their patronage. See Li-Hua Yu, supra note 47, at 124-25.
51. See Li-Hua Yu, supra note 47, at 124-25.
52. See A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 16, at 63; Ong,
supra note 15, at 103.
53. In San Francisco, for example, laundries had to be situated so that there were
at least ten doors between them. See A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA,
supra note 16, at 63.
54. For example, when a washhouse closed, workers left unemployed received first
opportunity at jobs at other laundries and received temporary room and board from
other members of the organization. See Ong, supra note 15, at 103.
55. See A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 16, at 63; Ong,
supra note 15, at 103.
56. See SIU, supra note 42, at 53. The majority of American laundrymen were
born in Toyshan District, China. See id. at 107.
57. See Ong, supra note 15, at 95.
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Several events soon led to the establishment of even more
Chinese-owned laundries throughout the West. In the 1860s,
many Chinese immigrants, tired of battling hostile miners,
found work building the Central Pacific Railroad. By the time of
the railroad's completion in 1869, approximately eighty-three
percent of the 12,500 railroad construction workers were Chi-
nese."8 The completion of the railroad left these laborers unem-
ployed. 9 Meanwhile, a series of successful strikes by white
mineworkers from 1867 to 1869 led many mining companies to
ban Chinese miners from underground work and often from all
mining jobs. When strikes proved unsuccessful, miners and
union activists sometimes resorted to violence against the Chi-
nese.
61
Deprived of other opportunities, many Chinese took low-pay-
ing manufacturing jobs in California cities. 2 In 1870, forty-six
percent of the workers in the four main industries in San Fran-
cisco were Chinese, as were twenty-five percent of all wage earn-
ers in California.63 Meanwhile, de jure discrimination against
Chinese laborers increased. For example, in the spring of 1870,
San Francisco promulgated an ordinance excluding Chinese from
public works jobs.64 In 1872, Oregon passed a statute similarly
prohibiting the employment of Chinese on public works pro-
jects.65 In July of 1875, the proprietors of a shirt factory, which
58. See SEWARD, supra note 30, at 23-24; Boswell, supra note 26, at 361.
59. This pattern repeated itself when the Northern Pacific built its line through
the Pacific Northwest. At one point, the Northern Pacific employed 15,000 Chinese
laborers in Washington, and another 6000 in Montana and Idaho. See William T.
White, A History of Railroad Workers in the Pacific Northwest, 1883-1934, at 8
(1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with the
University of Idaho Library).
60. See Boswell, supra note 26, at 361.
61. See id. at 357 (discussing the racial antagonism and riots targeted at the
Chinese).
62. See TAKAKI, supra note 30, at 87-88 (discussing the racial antagonism and
riots targeted at the Chinese); Boswell, supra note 26, at 362. By 1880, 52% of boot
and shoe workers, 84.4% of cigar manufacturers, and 32.7% of woolen mills workers
were Chinese. See Boswell, supra note 26, at 363.
63. See LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS 10 (1995).
64. See WILLIAM J. COURTNEY, SAN FRANCISCO ANTI-CHINESE ORDINANCES, 1850-
1900, at 49 (reprint 1974) (1956).
65. See Baker v. Portland, 2 F. Cas. 472, 473 (D. Or.) (No. 777) (voiding this
statute).
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planned to employ about 400 people, received a boiler permit
conditioned on their agreement to employ no more than 150 Chi-
nese. The permit further required the factory to decrease that
number each quarter until the entire work force was white.66
Skilled craft unions further limited economic opportunity for
Chinese immigrants by trying to exclude the Chinese from their
trades.67 Violence and discriminatory local legislation forced the
Chinese out of the fishing industry."
Many Chinese workers tired of holding tenuous jobs as un-
skilled and semi-skilled laborers and became entrepreneurs. The
Chinese specialized in three businesses: restaurants, vegetable
peddling, and laundries. By 1870, almost three-quarters of
California's laundry workers were Chinese. 69 Between 1870 and
1880, the percentage of California Chinese working as launder-
ers rose from 4.92 to 8.14.70 A far higher percentage of Chinese
worked in the laundry business in some communities in Cali-
fornia and elsewhere.7 Some Chinese worked in laundries
owned by whites, but most either owned their own businesses or
66. See COURTNEY, supra note 64, at 58.
67. See Boswell, supra note 26, at 362. Chinese cigar workers, for example, were
under constant attack. In 1874, the Cigar Makers' Union in California adopted a
white label to indicate that cigars were made by white union men. See Herbert Hill,
Black Labor and Affirmative Action: An Historical Perspective, in THE QUESTION OF
DISCRIUNATION 190, 200 (Steven Shulman & William Darity, Jr. eds., 1989). The
cigar box had a reproduction of the union's logo, along with the words "White Labor,
White Labor" and the following message:
Buy no cigars
except from the box marked
with the trade union label
thus you help maintain the
white as against the Coolie
standard of life and work
Id. This is the origin of the union label. See id. at 201.
68. See, e.g., ARTHUR MCEVOY, THE FISHERMEN'S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN
THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980, at 112-19 (1986).
69. See Ong, supra note 15, at 95.
70. See Eric Fong & William T. Markham, Immigration, Ethnicity and Conflict:
The California Chinese, 1849-1882, 61 SOC. INQUIRY 471, 481 (1991).
71. See, e.g., Ronald M. James et al., Competition and Coexistence in the Laundry:
A View of the Comstock, 25 W. HIST. Q. 165, 167 (1994) (reporting that in 1880, 149
Chinese, constituting 28.6% of the Chinese male population of Virginia City, Nevada,
worked as laundrymen).
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worked for other Chinese.72 Many of those who worked for other
Chinese either ultimately opened their own laundries or bought
out employers who decided to return to China.73
Chinese laundries received most of their business from poor
whites who could not otherwise afford to have their shirts laun-
dered. Wealthier whites had washing done in their houses, pri-
marily by white servants.74 Despite the valuable service ren-
dered by the Chinese to the poorer citizens of the West, the
laundry business proved to be only a temporary refuge from
white hostility.
The Chinese were particularly vulnerable to gender-related
criticism because they were "men doing women's work." In Mon-
tana and other sparsely settled locales, whites charged Chinese
laundrymen with crowding out widows and other single women
from the laundry field. In more settled urban areas like San
Francisco, the Chinese stood accused of disrupting white fami-
lies by taking away a task traditionally assigned to house-
wives.75
Anti-Chinese organizations spread false rumors about Chinese
laundries. Perhaps the most mundane rumor charged that the
Chinese routinely cheated their customers.76 Other accusations
required more imagination. For example, from a distance it
appeared to some that Chinese laundrymen sprayed water and
starch from their mouths onto clothes as they ironed.77 The pro-
cess actually involved blowing air through a tube filled with
72. See SIU, supra note 42, at 77-82.
73. See id. at 82-85.
74. See SEWARD, supra note 30, at 115. Wealthier people were particularly hesi-
tant to send their clothes to the Chinese because the Chinese had a reputation for
being rough with good fabric and for mixing all sorts of clothes together. See id. at
341-42.
75. See Ong, supra note 15, at 105. Similar sentiments were voiced in Canada.
See Lee Wai-Man, Dance No More: Chinese Hand Laundries in Toronto, POLYPHONY,
Summer 1984, at.33.
76. This led, for example, to a Portland law requiring launderers to give a written
receipt to their customers. See In re Wan Yin (The Laundry License Case), 22 F.
701, 701 (D. Or. 1885). This further led to a union-backed campaign in 1886 to force
Chinese launderers in Los Angeles to write tickets in English. See GRACE H.
STIMSON, RISE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN LOS ANGELES 66 (1955).
77. See MARY MCNAIR MATrHEWS, TEN YEARS IN NEVADA, OR, LIFE ON THE PACIF-
IC COAST 252-53 (reprint 1985) (1880).
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water. Anti-Chinese activists nevertheless insisted that Chinese
laundrymen spit on clothing and thereby spread disease.7" Even
people sympathetic to the Chinese believed the water-spraying
myth.79 Opponents of the Chinese also argued that the open
cesspools behind Chinese laundries were a significant health
hazard."0 The Los Angeles Times attributed the appearance of
78. See James et al., supra note 71, at 170-71; Raymond Lou, Chinese-American
Agricultural Workers and the Anti-Chinese Movement in Los Angeles, in LABOR DIVID-
ED: RACE AND ETHNICITY IN UNITED STATES LABOR STRUGGLES, 1835-1960, at 49, 60
(Robert Asher & Charles Stephenson eds., 1990) [hereinafter Lou, Chinese-American
Agricultural Workers]; Michele Shover, Chico Women: Nemesis of a Rural Town's
Anti-Chinese Campaigns, 1876-1888, 67 CAL. HIST. Soc'Y Q. 228, 235 (1988); Stacy
A. Flaherty, Boycott in Butte, MONT.: MAG. W. HIST., Winter 1987, at 34, 37; Paul
A. Frisch, The 'Gilbraltar of Unionism:' The Working Class of Butte, Montana, 1878-
1906, at 183 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles)
(on file with the University of California, Los Angeles Library); cf. ROSE HUM LEE,
THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN
REGION 112 (Arno Press 1978) (1947) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago) (recount-
ing complaints that Chinese laundrymen had "filthy, nasty habits... especially
when sprinkling clothes").
In 1882, Los Angeles passed an ordinance prohibiting the spraying of water on
clothes by using the mouth. See Raymond Lou, The Chinese American Community of
Los Angeles, 1870-1900: A Case of Resistance, Organization, and Participation 128
(1982) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Irvine) (on file with the
University of California, Irvine Library) [hereinafter Lou, The Chinese American
Community]. The fate of this law is unknown.
Honolulu passed a measure banning this practice of blowing water through
tubes in 1896. See Republic v. Ching Geung, 11 Haw. 667, 668 (1899). The Supreme
Court of Hawaii held that the law was unconstitutionally overbroad because it ap-
plied even to someone engaging in the practice in his own home on his own cloth-
ing. See id. The Hawaii Supreme Court later upheld a narrower Oahu law banning
the practice of "spraying clothes with liquid projected from the mouth" in commercial
laundries in Territory v. Ah Choy, 17 Haw. 331, 331 (1906). The Chinese defendants
challenged this law on the grounds that it was unreasonable and because it was
class legislation directed against Chinese laundrymen. See id. The court acknowl-
edged that it was uncontested that no harm from the practice had ever been shown,
and that only Chinese laundrymen engaged in the practice, but upheld the law nev-
ertheless. See i&
79. See MCLEOD, supra note 20, at 114. Historians, relying on primary sources,
have also been taken in by the myth. See, e.g., SANDY LYDON, CHINEE GOLD: THE
CHINESE IN THE MONTEREY BAY REGION 243 (1985); Liestman, supra note 47, at 76;
Trull, supra note 42, at 22.
Anti-Chinese laundry propaganda used the spitting myth as late and as far
away from its original source as 1930s New York. See RENQIU YU, To SAVE CHINA,
To SAVE OURSELVES: THE CHINESE HAND LAUNDRY ALLIANCE OF NEW YORK 32
(1992).
80. See LYDON, supra note 79, at 187, 245; Daniel Liestman, The Various
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mysterious "syphilitic sores" among "moral persons" to Chinese
washhouses.8 '
Like other Chinese immigrants, the vast majority of Chinese
laundrymen either were bachelors or left their wives in China.12
The resulting gender imbalance led to wild accusations of sexual
misconduct among the Chinese, especially laundrymen. People
charged that "[olrientals beguiled little girls to their laundries to
commit crimes too horrible to imagine."3 As late as 1902, Ameri-
can Federation of Labor leader Samuel Gompers claimed that
the Chinese enticed little white boys and girls into becoming
"opium fiends."" According to Gompers, the children then spent
their days in the back of laundry rooms as sex slaves to the
Chinese. 5
Hostile attitudes towards Chinese laundrymen led to propos-
als for hostile legislation. Labor unions often promoted this
legislation.8 Union leaders found they could strengthen their
movement by advocating anti-Chinese measures, even in fields
Celestials Among Our Town: Euro-American Response to Port Townsend's Chinese
Colony, 85 PAC. NORTHWEST Q. 93, 95 (1994); Lou, Chinese-American Agricultural
Workers, supra note 78, at 60. Liestman points out that the sanitary conditions of
all laundries, Chinese and non-Chinese, were similar, but only the Chinese laundry-
men faced legal harassment. See Liestman, supra, at 95-96. In Port Townsend, a $20
annual tax was placed on the Chinese, allegedly to force them to improve sanitation.
See id. The lauridrymen successfully challenged this tax in court. See id Coolidge
states that "the French laundries of the poorer class were quite as unsanitary [as
the Chinese laundries]." COOIMGE, supra note 23, at 269.
81. William R. Locklear, The Celestials and the Angels: A Study of the Anti-Chi-
nese Movement in Los Angeles to 1882, 42 HIST. Soc'Y S. CAL. Q. 239, 253 (1960).
82. See SIu, supra note 42, at 156-75.
83. OSCAR HANDLIN, THE AMERICANS 304 (1963); see also STUART C. MILLER, THE
UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT 185-86 (1969) (describing incidents in which Chinese laun-
drymen allegedly "ravag[ed] more than twenty young white girls between the ages of
9 and 13 in the back room" and led other women into a life of prostitution). These
rumors spread across the continent. As a result of the hysteria, Massachusetts
passed a law, later invalidated by the state Supreme Court, prohibiting women un-
der age 21 from entering Chinese-owned establishments. See In re Opinion of the
Justices, 207 Mass. 601 (1911). In 1912, Saskatchewan passed a law prohibiting
Chinese men from employing white women. See Constance Backhouse, The White
Women's Labor Laws: Anti-Chinese Racism in Early Twentieth Century Canada, 14
LAW & HIST. REV. 315, 345 (1996).
84. SAMUEL GOMPERS & HERMAN GUSTADT, SOME REASONS FOR CHINESE EXCLU-
SION: MEAT VS. RICE, AMERICAN MANHOOD AGAINST ASIATIC COOLIEISM-WHICH
SHALL SURVIVE?, S. DoC. NO. 57-137, at 29 (1902).
85. See id. at 18-22.
86. See Lou, The Chinese-American Community, supra note 78, at 128.
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where the Chinese did not directly compete with whites, such as
the laundry industry. 7 In fact, labor unions were active in anti-
Chinese efforts in cities where few Chinese directly competed
with whites.88 For labor leaders,
the anti-Chinese movement became a means by which they
could manipulate the political and organizational energy of
the entire labor force, . . . thereby using the Chinese issue as
a device to prevent an active challenge to their leadership
and to their control of unionized occupations by unemployed
and unskilled workers.8 9
Similarly, politicians found they could appeal to white constitu-
ents by promulgating discriminatory measures. 90 Chinese immi-
87. "The labor and anti-Chinese movements overlapped so thoroughly as to be
scarcely distinguishable in California, where the exclusion issue provided the basis
for labor solidarity at key points." DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 179
(1991) (citing ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSIBLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-
CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 19-20 (1971)).
88. See, e.g., GEOFFREY DUNN, SANTA CRUZ IS IN THE HEART (1983); Lou, The
Chinese-American Community, supra note 78, at 128.
89. Herbert Hill, Anti-Oriental Agitation and the Rise of Working-Class Racism,
SOCIETY, Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 43, 46. This policy gave unions far "more legitimacy and
influence in some of the industrial regions of the Far West than in most other sec-
tions of the country." GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 225 (1981); see also ROGER
DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE
1850, at 29-30 (1988) ("Labor leaders from Dennis Kearney through Samuel
Gompers, and almost all of the leaders of American socialism, insisted that Chinese
be kept out, sent home, and denied citizenship."); MICHAEL KAZIN, BARONS OF LA-
BOR: THE SAN FRANCISCO BUILDING TRADES AND UNION POWER IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 163 (1987) ("From the 1860s to the 1920s, the demand for Asian exclusion
bound together white wage-earners in a movement that spoke loudly and forcefully
for a majority of Californians. Organized labor spearheaded the mobilization and
thereby gained support from citizens who either could not or would not join a un-
ion."). Coolidge points out that the rise in anti-Chinese legislation in San Francisco
correlated with the rise of San Francisco trade unions. See COOLIDGE, supra note 23,
at 344-45.
In Montana, the Knights of Labor, which represented both skilled and unskilled
workers, led the anti-Chinese movement. See Frisch, supra note 78, at 162-63. The
Chinese rarely competed with members of the Knights for jobs, but opposition to the
Chinese nevertheless brought them some advantages. See id. ("In Montana, xeno-
phobia solidified the ranks of organized labor, brought new recruits into the union
fold, [and] strengthened labor's support with the middle class.. . . "); see also White,
supra note 59, at 8 ("Local [union] organizers relied heavily on the widespread anti-
Chinese prejudices in the region to recruit new members.").
90. See Ong, supra note 15, at 100, 106.
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grants, meanwhile, lacked the political power to stop such mea-
sures; applicable federal law banned them from citizenship be-
cause they were neither white nor "Negro."
When a recession hit the Western United States in the late
1870s, anti-Chinese sentiment swelled. Western whites failed to
persuade the federal government to exclude Chinese immigrants
from the United States, so westerners attempted to use violence,
boycotts, and state and local legislation to force out the Chinese.
Laundrymen were among the main victims of this "Chinese
Must Go" movement. For example, in January 1877, the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors appropriated $1500 to the
Citizen's Anti-Chinese Committee to stir up anti-Chinese senti-
ment.91 Later that year, anti-Chinese mobs descended on China-
town and destroyed twenty-five Chinese laundries.92
Despite violence against Chinese laundries and legal harass-
ment, the number of Chinese laundries continued to grow. By
1880, over three-quarters of all laundrymen in California were
Chinese.93 Workers and owners shared in the laundries' prosper-
ity, as demonstrated by a doubling of wages for Chinese laundry
workers between 1882 and 1909.
94
Anti-Chinese sentiment in the West arguably hit its zenith
between 1879 and 1886. In 1879, the virulently anti-Chinese
Workingman's Party candidate received forty-five percent of the
91. See COURTNEY, supra note 64, at 64.
92. See A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 16, at 63; MCLEOD,
supra note 20, at 207; Connie Y. Yu, The Chinese in American Courts, BULL. CON-
CERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, Fall 1972, at 22, 27. Chinese laundries were also a partic-
ular target of rioters in Denver in 1880. See Roy T. Wortman, Denver's Anti-Chinese
Riot, 1880, 42 COLO. MAG. 275, 284-85 (1965).
Some of the San Francisco Chinese filed suit against the city and recovered
damages because the city had failed to give them adequate protection from the riot-
ers. See CHARLES J. McCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY. THE CHINESE STRUGGLE
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 321 n.9 (1994). Never-
theless, until around the turn of the century, Chinese laundries in San Francisco
had to be "barricaded against hoodlums with wire netting and bars" until they
looked like prisons. COOLIDGE, supra note 23, at 269.
In 1878, an unrepentant San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a law that
banned the use of Chinese granite as a building material on public works, and also
banned opium smoking, a favored pastime of the Chinese. See COURTNEY, supra note
64, at 67.
93. See Ong, supra note 15, at 95.
94. See COOLIDGE, supra note 23, at 387.
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vote for California governor, just a percentage point less than
the victorious Republican candidate.95 Also in 1879, California
enacted a new constitution containing several anti-Chinese pro-
visions.96 Federal courts invalidated most of these statutes. 7 State
courts, meanwhile, could not be trusted to protect the rights of
the Chinese-most of the individuals elected to the California
Supreme Court and other political offices in 1879 were members
of the Workingman's Party.98 As this Article discusses in detail
below, beginning in 1880, San Francisco passed a series of mea-
sures intended to drive the Chinese out of the laundry busi-
ness.99 Two of these measures reached the United States Su-
preme Court with mixed results. Other cities also passed anti-
Chinese legislation in the early 1880s.
California was a swing state in national elections.1 0 Congres-
sional Democrats and Republicans, pandering to anti-Chinese
sentiment in that state, passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in
1882, excluding most potential Chinese immigrants from the
United States.'0 1 Anti-Chinese forces in the West, however, were
not satisfied because resident Chinese were not expelled. This
dissatisfaction was exacerbated by the fact that some Chinese
continued to arrive in the United States because of loopholes in
the Act and fraud. In late 1885 and early 1886, anti-Chinese
sentiments climaxed and violent anti-Chinese riots broke out
throughout the West.
95. See Fong & Markham, supra note 70, at 483.
96. For a discussion of, and lengthy quotations from, various sections of the Cali-
fornia State Constitution at issue, see In re Tribucio Parrott, 1 F. 481, 483-86, 499-
501 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
97. See, e.g., id. at 514-15 (invalidating a provision banning corporations from
employing Chinese).
98. Cf MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 79-83 (describing the Workingman's Party's
rise to power, their successes in the 1878 and 1879 elections, and their influence in
the Constitutional convention of 1879); ELMER CLARENCE SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-
CHINESE MovMENT iN CALIFoRNiA 63-75 (describing the Workingman's Party's rise
to power through the leadership of Dennis Kearney, and its subsequent victories in
the 1879 elections and the Constitutional convention of 1879).
99. See infra notes 108-462 and accompanying text.
100. See DANIElS, supra note 89, at 54 ("The presidential election of 1880 in Cali-
fornia was decided by fewer than one hundred votes in a canvass of 164,000, and in
no national election from 1876 through 1896 did the winning candidate have a mar-
gin of more than 13,000 votes in California.").
101. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
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Local governments continued to promulgate anti-Chinese
laundry legislation in the late 1880s and early 1890s, particu-
larly in California. By the early 1900s, however, the Chinese
issue was far less significant in Western politics. The federal
government renewed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 189202 and
1902."03 With Chinese immigration drastically reduced and a
massive shortage of Chinese women available for the Chinese
men already residing in the United States, the Chinese popu-
lation of California dwindled,' 04 while the white population in-
creased substantially. By the 1910s, Japanese immigrants, who
did not yet face immigration restrictions, became a target of the
enmity previously reserved for the Chinese.'15
Cities nevertheless occasionally promulgated anti-Chinese
laundry laws through the 1930s. In addition, general regulatory
laws, such as zoning and maximum hours laws, failed to take
into account the interests of the politically powerless Chinese
laundrymen. The Chinese had become increasingly concentrated
in cities,'0 6 and within those cities concentrated in the laundry
business. Any laws that harmed Chinese laundries were there-
fore a tremendous economic threat to the Chinese community as
a whole. Fortunately, federal courts allowed Chinese laundries
to thrive by protecting Chinese laundrymen from hostile regu-
lations. From 1900 to 1930, approximately twenty-five percent of
all employed male Chinese in the United States worked in laun-
dries."0 7 Of those laundrymen who started families in the United
States, many sent their children to college and beyond, thereby
creating a prosperous-albeit for many decades small and isolat-
ed-Chinese-American community. The next section of this Arti-
cle reviews the various types of legislation used to harm Chinese
laundrymen and the courts' reactions to those laws.
102. See Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943).
103. See Act of April 29, 1902, ch. 641, 32 Stat. 176 (repealed 1943).
104. The total Chinese-American population shrank from 105,465 persons in 1880
to 89,863 in 1900 and 61,639 in 1920. See TAKAKI, supra note 30, at 111-12.
105. See ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MoVE-
MENT IN CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION 74-78 (1962);
David E. Bernstein, Two Asian Laundry Cases, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 95, 101-08
(1999).
106. See DANIELS, supra note 89, at 69.
107. See Peter S. Li, Ethnic Businesses Among Chinese in the U.S., J. ETHNIC
STUD., Fall 1976, at 35, 39 (1976).
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II. ANTI-CHINESE LAUNDRY LEGISLATION AND THE JuDIcIAL
RESPONSE
During the worst period of anti-Chinese agitation, from the
1860s to around 1900, Western jurisdictions passed dozens of
facially neutral laws intended to harm Chinese laundries. Maxi-
mum hours laws, zoning laws, licensing laws, and tax laws were
all used in the war against Chinese laundries. State courts gen-
erally upheld these laws as proper exercises of the police power.
Federal courts, however, often invalidated them as a violation of
the Chinese's Fourteenth Amendment right to pursue a lawful
occupation. Federal courts invalidated laundry laws on grounds
of racial discrimination in rare cases, such as in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,' when the Chinese litigants proved that the laws in
question affected only the Chinese.
After 1900, legislation targeted Chinese laundrymen less
often. Because the laundrymen could not vote, however, regula-
tory legislation passed for nondiscriminatory reasons, including
certain zoning and maximum hours laws, failed to take into
account the laundrymen's interests and injured them
disproportionately. Chinese laundrymen therefore launched
aggressive litigation campaigns to have these laws declared
unconstitutional, at least as, applied to Chinese laundries. The
Chinese also continued to battle sporadic zoning, maximum
hours, and tax laws that had discriminatory intent. Depending
on the issues raised in a particular case, courts ruling in favor of
the Chinese relied on either Yick Wo or Lochner.
A. Maximum Hours Laws
In a deliberate attempt to harm Chinese laundries, San Fran-
cisco passed the first maximum hours law applying to laundries
in 1882.1' Despite the clear discriminatory intent, the United
States Supreme Court upheld this law as a reasonable exercise
of the police power that was intended to reduce the risk of night-
108. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
109. See Gioia, supra note 47, at 212-13 (stating that although "[slome of these
ordinances were legitimate guidelines . . . most were discriminatory in nature since
they placed an undue burden on ... Chinese laundries").
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time fires.1 ° The Court also held that maximum hours laws did
not violate the liberty interests of laundry workers.'
In the early twentieth century, San Francisco again began to
enforce and tighten its maximum hours regulations affecting
laundries. Although this crackdown was not primarily a result of
anti-Chinese sentiment, the Chinese nevertheless suffered
disproportionately. Meanwhile, in Lochner v. New York," 2 the
Supreme Court held maximum hours laws to be unconstitution-
al. A state court upheld the San Francisco maximum hours law,
but a federal court held it unconstitutional under Lochner."
3
Oakland passed its own laundry hours law, one of the last inten-
tionally anti-Chinese laundry laws, in the 1930s, but the state
Supreme Court invalidated this law under Lochner."4
1. San Francisco's 1882 Maximum Hours Law
In the 1880s, Chinese laundrymen typically worked from ten
to sixteen hours per day.115 Many Chinese laundries, however,
operated twenty-four hours a day. To meet high rents, San Fran-
cisco laundrymen often had two firms sharing the same space
and facilities, working in shifts and alternating their signs.116 In
October 1882, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed an
ordinance that, among other things, prohibited the laundering of
clothes between 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. 117 This law therefore
effectively prohibited the sharing of laundry facilities. The law
went into effect in January 1883, and the city quickly arrested
one hundred Chinese laundrymen for violating it.",
In June of the same year, the board of supervisors passed a
new measure identical in all relevant respects to the previous
110. See Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S.
27 (1885).
111. See Soon Hing, 113 U.S. at 708-10.
112. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
113. See infra notes 217-37 and accompanying text.
114. See id.
115. See Gioia, supra note 47, at 212.
116. See H. H. BANCROFT, ESSAYS AND MISCELLANEOUS, MONGOLIANISM IN AMERICA
348 (n.p. 1890); A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 16, at 63;
MCLEOD, supra note 20, at 114.
117. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 106.
118. See id.
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law.119 Laundryman Woo Yeck challenged this new ordinance
after authorities arrested him for washing clothes at a time
banned by the statute.120 A San Francisco Superior Court judge
ruled the measure valid, but Woo Yeck's attorney managed to
petition for another habeas writ.121 The Superior Court of
Alameda County in Oakland heard the petition and held that
the ordinance was unconstitutional because it interfered "with
the natural and inalienable right of every individual... to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and to acquire, hold and
enjoy property."1 2
After the Oakland opinion was released, Chinese laundrymen
ignored the ordinance. m San Francisco authorities therefore
sought a new opportunity to test the validity of the law.' A
white launderer named Emile Moynier agreed to cooperate in a
test case.12 5 It is not clear whether Moynier sincerely objected to
the law; he may have cooperated with the City hoping that the
law would be upheld, thereby putting his Chinese competitors
out of business. In any event, the Chinese laundrymen's guild
retained counsel, which entered the case as amicus curiae.126
A three-judge panel of the Supreme Court of California upheld
the law in the Moynier case.' The court first held that the pro-
visions of the ordinance relating to fire safety and sanitation
were clearly lawful police measures.128 The provisions were not
discriminatory, the court added, because they applied to "all
persons" in the laundry business. 9 As for the hours provision of
the ordinance, the court simply stated: "[W]e cannot say it is not
119. See In re Woo Yeck, 12 Pac. Coast L.J. 382, 382 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1883).
120. See id.
121. See ALFRED CLARKE, REPORT OF ALFRED CLARKE, SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO IN THE LAUNDRY ORDER LITIGATION 6 (n.p.
1885).
122. Woo Yeck, 12 Pac. Coast L.J. at 3.
123. See CLARKE, supra note 121, at 7.
124. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 108.
125. See CLARKE, supra note 121, at 6 (referring to Moynier as a "test case").
126. See McCLAIN, supra note 92, at 108.
127. See Ex parte Moynier, 2 P. 728 (Cal. 1884).
128. See id. at 729-30.
129. Id. at 730.
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necessary... for the proper police and sanitary condition of the
city." 130
The Chinese laundrymen did not give up. They continued to
engage in civil disobedience by ignoring the ordinance, leading to
three hundred arrests.1 3 ' The laundrymen proceeded to tie up
San Francisco's police courts by demanding jury trials.112
The laundrymen's lawyer, Thomas Riordan, filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus with the full California Supreme Court
on behalf of a laundryman, Soon Hing, who had been arrested
for violating the ordinance. 1" The court denied the petition."
Riordan then filed a new petition for a writ of habeas corpus
with the federal circuit court.'35 Riordan argued that the ordi-
nance was not a proper exercise of the police power, but was
intended only to "oppress" Chinese laundrymen. 13 1 The two-judge
panel split on the issue,"7 which led Riordan to appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.
3 1
Meanwhile, San Francisco's attorney, Alfred Clarke, arranged
another test case involving a white launderer named Francis
Barbier. 13 9 For procedural reasons ancillary to this discussion,
Barbier's case reached the Supreme Court first in Barbier v.
Connolly.' Barbier was a test case that Clarke manufactured.
According to Clarke, "[sicrupulous care was taken to make it a
fair test case, and to present fully all the specifications of error
that had been presented by the opponents of the order."' In
fact, however, Clarke intentionally failed to raise the claim that
the statute resulted from anti-Chinese discriminatory motives,
even though he knew that a Chinese litigant such as Soon Hing
would have raised this claim. Clarke justified this omission by
130. Id.







138. See id. at 5.
139. See id. at 6.
140. 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
141. CLARKE, supra note 121, at 6.
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noting that Soon Hing "signs his name with an X" and therefore
was likely "misinformed as to the motives of the Board."'42 Be-
sides, Clarke added, "it is questionable whether the judicial
power has the authority to examine the motives of a legislative
body which is a co-ordinate branch of the Government."'
Had the Supreme Court realized that Barbier did not present
a true case or controversy, it would have been obligated to dis-
miss the case for lack of standing. Instead, the Court issued a
ruling favorable to the city.'" Justice Field, writing for a unani-
mous Court, rejected the claim that a limitation on launderers'
working hours was unconstitutional both as a deprivation of the
individual's right to labor and as impermissible "class legisla-
tion."145 Field stated that the law was a permissible police power
regulation intended to reduce the risk of fires.' After this ad-
verse decision, many Chinese laundrymen began to comply with
the hours ordinance.'47 By this time, the police courts had al-
ready collected $1680 in fines from those who had disobeyed the
law. l14
The Supreme Court dashed any hopes the Chinese still had of
defeating the ordinance when it announced its decision in Soon
Hing v. Crowley,149 just two months after it decided Barbier.
Riordan argued that the legislature adopted the hours regula-
tion ordinance to compel Chinese laundrymen to abandon their
lawful businesses." ° Justice Field, once again writing for a
unanimous Court, found that the hours regulation was "purely a
police regulation" and therefore was within the ordinary powers
of a municipality.'51 San Francisco was subject to high winds
and was composed mostly of wooden buildings, so "regulations of





144. See Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32.
145. Id
146. See id. at 30-31.
147. See Clarke, supra note 121, at 7.
148. See id&
149. 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
150. See id. at 708.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Riordan also argued that the ordinance illicitly discriminated
between the laundry industry and other industries.15 Under the
ordinance, Riordan argued, all other industries were allowed to
employ workers during the hours forbidden to the laundry in-
dustry.'" According to Riordan, this discrimination compelled a
finding that the ordinance was invalid. 55 Field responded that
other businesses may not pose as great a risk of fire as laun-
dries, which constantly needed fire to heat water. 56
Field also rejected Riordan's argument that the ordinance
discriminated between small laundries, which in effect could not
operate late at night at all, and larger laundries, which special-
ized in the "fluting, polishing, blueing, and wringing of
clothes." 57 According to Riordan, the ordinance permitted the
latter activities at night.15 8 Field responded that it was not at all
clear to him that the ordinance permitted these activities.'59
Even if it did, however, Field noted that these activities present-
ed a lesser fire hazard.
160
Next, Field rejected Riordan's argument that the ordinance
violated a constitutional right to labor for such hours as a per-
son may choose. Field argued that society may set some limits
on liberty of contract if these limits benefit the public.' Laws
regulating the hours of labor, Field added, "have always been
deemed beneficent and merciful laws, especially to the poor and
dependent, to the laborers in our factories and workshops and in
the heated rooms of our cities; and their validity has been sus-
tained by the highest courts of the States."
162
Finally, Justice Field reached Riordan's "principal objection"
to the ordinance-that hatred of the Chinese motivated it."
Field concluded that the Court was bound by the language of the
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 708-09.
156. See id
157. Id. at 709.
158. See id.
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statute, which displayed no discrimination against the Chi-
nese.164 Even if the supervisors had discriminatory motives,
Field added, the ordinance would not be invalid "unless in its
enforcement it is made to operate only against the class men-
tioned."
165
After the Supreme Court ruling, maximum hours laws spread
to other cities. Los Angeles, for example, passed a law in the
spring of 1885 forbidding laundries to operate after 9:30 P.M.'
6
The night that ordinance went into effect, police arrested sixty-
five laundrymen.
167
2. Maximum Hours Legislation in Early Twentieth-Century
San Francisco
Over a decade after the Supreme Court decided Soon Hing,
Chinese laundrymen again came into conflict with San Francisco
authorities over maximum hours legislation. According to one
contemporary source, the main impetus for these laws was pub-
lic concern over the working conditions faced by young women
employed by white-owned steam laundries.1 6 1 Women-dominated,
whites-only laundry unions played a major role in promoting the
legislation. 6 9 Steam laundry owners also supported maximum
hours laws.'70 They apparently believed it would give them a
competitive advantage over the French, Japanese, and Chinese-
owned hand laundries with which they competed. 7 ' Chinese




165. Id. at 711 (emphasis added).
166. See Lou, The Chinese American Community, supra note 78, at 128.
167. See id.
168. See Lillian R. Matthews, Women in Trade Unions in San Francisco, 3 U. CAL.
PUBLICATIONS ECON. 1, 11-12 (1913). Matthews explained that white women replaced
Chinese workers in steam laundries in the 1880s. See id. at 10.
169. See id. at 12.
170. See ia
171. See id, It soon became clear, for example, that French-owned hand laundries,
which provided most of their workers with room and board, had difficulty complying
with the ordinance. See id. at 33-34.
172. See id, at 12-13.
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The first new hours law, passed in 1900, prohibited work in
laundries between the hours of 7:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M.' 73 Appar-
ently, a court declared this law unconstitutional within a few
months of its enactment.174 In 1901, the whites-only Laundry
Workers' Union signed a contract with the owners of large
white-owned steam laundries. This contract established a ten-
hour work day and a sixty-hour work week.175 In 1903, the union
won an agreement for a nine-hour work day. In 1907, steam
laundry owners agreed to establish a forty-eight-hour work
week, 176 but only if French and Japanese-owned laundries adopt-
ed the same work week. 77 The Japanese-a growing presence in
the laundry industry who were subject to attack by the union
and the owner-supported "Anti-Jap Laundry League"' 7 8-- refused
to comply, as did the mostly family-run French hand laun-
dries. 179 Japanese laundry workers received weekly wages simi-
lar to those received by white workers, plus room and board. 80
In return for this higher compensation, Japanese laundrymen
worked ten hours a day, plus overtime, as opposed to the eight-
hour work day that white workers sought.1
81
When the French and Japanese did not go along, the union
again turned to legislation. In 1912, San Francisco enacted an
ordinance prohibiting a broad range of laundry-related activities,
including washing, ironing, and delivering clothes between 6:00
P.M. and 7:00 A.M. 1
82
By this time, the Chinese laundries apparently were not a
significant threat to white-owned steam laundries."a The city's
unofficial policy of refusing steam laundry permits to Asian
173. See id. at 13.
174. See ROBERT EDWARD LEE KNIGHT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE SAN FRANCIS-
Co BAY AREA, 1900-1918, at 47 (1960).
175. See id. at 65.
176. See id. at 190.
177. See id. at 191.
178. Yamato, supra note 17, at 47; see Matthews, supra note 168, at 34-36.
179. See Yamato, supra note 17, at 48-49.
180. See Shichiro Matsui, Economic Aspects of the Japanese Situation in California
61 (1922) (unpublished MA. thesis, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with
the University of California, Berkeley Library).
181. See id. at 63-64.
182. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE NO. 144, §§ 1, 4 (1912).
183. See Matthews, supra note 168, at 36.
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immigrants deprived the Chinese of their ability to compete on a
large-scale basis by forcing all Chinese laundrymen to operate
hand laundries. 8 ' The ordinance therefore had a significant
negative impact on the Chinese, and they waged a legal cam-
paign against it.
The first case attacking the ordinance arose in Ex parte Wong
Wing.85 when authorities arrested and a court subsequently con-
victed a laundryman named Wong Wing for ironing clothes dur-
ing the prohibited hours.1"
The California Supreme Court rejected Wong Wing's appeal."7
The court found that the hours regulation at issue was not an
"unreasonable exercise of the police power."188 The court cited Ex
parte Moynier,8 9 in which it had approved an ordinance forbid-
ding work in public laundries between 10:00 P.M. and 6:00
A.M."9 The court also cited the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Barbier and Soon Hing.1
9 1
Given the well-established general power of a municipal legis-
lature to regulate the hours of operation, the only remaining
question, the court stated, was the reasonableness of the eleven
hours of laundry work allowed by the statute.192 In addressing
this question, the court first recognized that previous courts had
upheld statutes that allowed laundries to operate for sixteen
hours a day. 93 The court then noted that many, perhaps most of
the occupations in San Francisco, were "conducted during less
than [the] 11 working hours a day" allowed by the ordinance."9
The court concluded that it was neither unreasonable nor uncon-
stitutional for the board of supervisors to limit the operating
hours of laundries to eleven hours.' 5
184. See Bernstein, supra note 105, at 97-98. The Chinese managed to survive by
keeping their prices low and working long hours. See id.
185. 138 P. 695 (Cal. 1914).
186. See id. at 695.
187. See id. at 696.
188. Id. at 695.
189. 2 P. 728 (Cal. 1884).
190. See id. at 730.
191. See Wong Wing, 138 P. at 695.
192. See id. at 696.
193. See id. at 695-96.
194. Id. at 696.
195. See id.
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Another laundryman, Yee Gee, challenged the same ordinance
in federal district court." Yee Gee's attorney made three dis-
tinct arguments in support of his request for a restraining order
against enforcement of the statute. First, he argued that, like
the ordinance in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, this ordinance contained a
provision that granted "the board of supervisors the arbitrary
discretion to grant or refuse licenses to carry on the laundry
business ... ."' The court rejected this argument because Yee
Gee had no standing to challenge the provision, as he had not
been denied a license.198
Yee Gee's attorney also argued that San Francisco passed the
law in order to discriminate against the Chinese.199 The court re-
jected this claim as well, citing Soon Hing for the proposition
that a legislative body's improper motive in adopting a measure
does not invalidate the measure if it is fair on its face and capa-
ble of impartial application.2 "0
Finally, Yee Gee's attorney attacked the hours provision of the
law as an unreasonable restraint on Yee Gee's ability to pursue
his occupation. 0 1 The city responded that the hours regulation
was a valid police power measure, citing Barbier v. Connolly,202
Soon Hing v. Crowley,20 and Ex parte Wong Wing °4 for sup-
port.2 05 The court rejected the city's argument, and concomi-
tantly, the California Supreme Court's Wong Wing opinion. The
Yee Gee court found that the Wong Wing opinion rested "largely,
if not entirely, upon the authority of the [Barbier] and [Soon
Hing] cases.... 2 6 What the California Supreme Court failed to
recognize, the court continued, was that the ordinance at issue
196. See Yee Gee v. City of San Francisco, 235 F. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
197. Id. at 759.
198. See id. at 760.
199. See id. at 758 (responding to petitioner's argument, the court stated that "[Ilt
is not alleged that the ordinance has received any partial or discriminating enforce-
ment . . ").
200. See id. (citing Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885)).
201. See id. at 759, 761.
202. 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
203. 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
204. 138 P. 695 (Cal. 1914).
205. See Yee Gee, 235 F. at 761.
206. Id. at 762.
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in Barbier and Soon Hing was easily distinguishable from the
1915 ordinance. 2°7 The latter ordinance, unlike the others, could
not be justified as reflecting a narrow concern with fire preven-
tion. Besides providing for longer working hours for launderers,
the Barbier and Soon Hing statutes banned only activities that
could create a fire hazard, such as washing and ironing, and
they only applied to certain areas of the city.2 0 8 By contrast, the
1915 ordinance applied uniformly to all activities associated
with the laundry business throughout the city,2" including such
innocuous activities as delivering and advertising.210
The court then turned to the question of whether the city
could justify the ordinance as an exercise of the police power.
The court quoted extensively from Lochner, to the effect that the
law at issue in Lochner, limiting the number of hours a baker
could work, could not be upheld under the police power as either
a labor law or a regulation for the protection of the health of
bakers. 1' The laundry law, the court declared, was "an unrea-
sonable interference with the liberty of the citizen in the prose-
cution of his occupation," and had "no real or substantial rela-
tion to the purpose sought to be accomplished."1 Laundries are
"a perfectly legitimate, harmless, and necessary business," and
not a danger to public health or safety.213
The court concluded by implicitly attacking the consistent
harassment of Chinese laundries through government regula-
tion. The laundry business, the court noted, had been subjected
to more "so-called police regulation than all other classes of
business combined," with ever greater restrictions imposed. 14
The court observed that the original requirement that San Fran-
cisco laundries be closed for eight hours a day in certain parts of




210. See id. at 763.
211. See id. at 766. Lochner implicitly invalidated Justice Field's dictum in Soon
Hing that maximum hours laws were within the police power. See Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905).
212. Yee Gee, 235 F. at 767.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 768.
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tire city be closed for thirteen hours a day.215 As with the kin-
dred regulation in Lochner, the laundry law was passed under
the pretense of being a police power regulation, but was "'in
reality, passed from other motives.'" 2 6
3. Oakland's 1935 Maximum Hours Law
The last significant maximum hours laundry case involved an
Oakland laundryman named Byron Mark.217 After World War I,
Chinese hand laundries in Oakland faced stiff competition from
more technologically advanced, white-owned steam laundries.
The Chinese retained a niche in the laundry industry by
maintaining competitive prices and working long hours.21" For
example, Mark and his employee worked from ten to sixteen
hours per day, six days a week.219 When the Chinese began us-
ing washing machines and electric irons in the 1930s, their
laundries became a serious comtietitive threat to white-owned
laundries.
White laundry owners believed they could protect themselves
from Chinese competition by limiting the hours the Chinese
laundrymen might work.22 0 Oakland's two white-owned laundry
associations hired an attorney to lobby for a maximum hours
ordinance.22 ' In 1935, the Oakland City Council passed a mea-
sure prohibiting any laundry from operating, picking up, or
delivering laundry between 6:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M. 2 2
In the months after the ordinance was passed, thirty-eight
Chinese laundrymen were arrested for working after 6:00 P.M.
They each pleaded guilty and paid a twenty-five dollar fine.
When Byron Mark was arrested for violating the hours law, he
decided to plead not guilty because he believed that the law was
215. See id.
216. Id. (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64).
217. Byron's grandson, Gregory, has written an excellent account of the litigation
and its background. See Gregory R. Mark, The 1935 Oakland Laundry Ordinance:
The Genesis of Discriminatory Justice, 11 Q.J. IDEOLOGY 41 (1987).
218. See id. at 49.
219. See id. at 44.
220. See id. at 49.
221. See id. at 48.
222. See id. at 45 (summarizing the Oakland Municipal Code of 1935).
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racially motivated and simply "not fair."2" The law posed a
grave threat to the ninety-three Chinese laundries in Oakland
and their four hundred workers.2"
Although Mark pleaded not guilty in Oakland Police Court,
the court nevertheless convicted and fined him twenty-five dol-
lars. Eventually, the case reached the California Supreme Court.
Mark's attorneys suggested in their brief that the law had a
racially discriminatory motive, but principally argued that the
city could not put restrictions on the hours of laundries that did
not also apply to any other occupation or business.225 They wrote
that "the whole scheme of this Statute is to single out the laun-
dryman, be he French or Chinese, and forbid him to do what
every other tradesman may do freely." 226 Finally, they argued
that the maximum hours law was a "'special law forbidden by
the State Constitution' [and that] it denied an individual's liber-
ty and property without due process of law and equal protection
of the laws." 22
7
The court found in favor of the laundrymen. The court distin-
guished the maximum hours laws held constitutional in prior
cases on the ground that, at least ostensibly, those laws "had
some reasonable relation to the prevention of fires at a time
when fires were a greater hazard and menace to life and proper-
ty."228 The court added, however, that the Oakland ordinance not
only prohibited actual laundering, which could be a fire hazard,
but also prohibited nonhazardous activities, such as soliciting,
picking up, and delivering laundry.2 29 Moreover, unlike the ordi-
nances sustained by the United States Supreme Court in
Barbier and Soon Hing, and the California Supreme Court in
Wong Wing, the Oakland ordinance applied to all laundries in
the city, without regard to the various levels of fire hazard pres-
223. Id. at 41.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 51.
226. Id. (quoting Mark's attorney, John L. McNab, in the Memorandum of Points
and Authorities on Behalf of the Petitioners he drafted in the case).
227. Id. (quoting Mark's attorney, John L. McNab, in the Memorandum of Points
and Authorities on Behalf of the Petitioners he drafted in the case).
228. In re Mark, 58 P.2d 913, 915 (Cal. 1936).
229. See id.
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ent in different parts of the city." ° Finally, the court favorably
quoted Yee Gee for the proposition that maximum hours laws for
laundries are unconstitutional if they are not narrowly tailored
to reduce the risk of fire."'
Having held that the law was not a valid police power mea-
sure, the court found the hours law to be unconstitutional under
Lochner v. New York 23 2 and other cases.' Moreover, the court
added, even if regulation of the hours of labor by itself were a
legitimate exercise of the police power, such regulations must
operate uniformly to be valid.2 " The court stated that the opera-
tion of a laundry is in no way a nuisance, nor is laundry work
particularly unhealthful. 5 Restricting the hours of launderers,
and no other workers the court concluded, was an "unreasonable
restriction upon the rights of laundry owners, operators, and
employees in the city of Oakland... ."' The law violated the
state and federal constitutions because it deprived Mark of his
liberty and property without due process of law and denied him
equal protection of the laws.
B. Licensing Laws
One of the most famous cases in American constitutional law,
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2 38 arose out of San Francisco's licensing
legislation promulgated to eliminate Chinese laundries." 9 After
a long legal battle, the litigants finally argued the constitution-
ality of the legislation before the United States Supreme Court.
In Yick Wo, the Court held that a facially neutral law is uncon-
stitutional if it is administered in a blatantly discriminatory
way.' The Court also suggested, in dictum, that due process
230. See id.
231. See id. at 916.
232. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
233. See Mark, 58 P.2d at 916.
234. See id.
235. See id. (citing In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229, 231 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882)).
236. Id.
237. See id. The court also decided a companion case, In re Wong Way, 58 P.2d
916 (Cal. 1936), the same way in a short per curiam opinion.
238. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
239. See id. at 357.
240. See id. at 373-74.
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requires that government officials not exercise arbitrary author-
ity over one's livelihood.'
On February 5, 1880, a fire in a San Francisco Chinese laun-
dry killed ten laundrymen. 2 At the next board of supervisors'
meeting, a supervisor introduced a bill requiring that all build-
ings 'erected and used by Chinese as laundries'... be con-
structed of brick or stone."' At the following meeting, the board
passed this measure after deleting the reference to the Chinese,
which would have rendered the law facially unconstitutional.'
The ordinance affected 310 out of the 320 laundries in San Fran-
cisco in 1880 that had been constructed of wood.' The Chinese
owned approximately three-quarters of the wood laundries.'
The board, however, did not simply want a general fire protec-
tion measure that would mainly affect Chinese laundries, but
one that would affect only them.247 In May, the board of supervi-
sors passed a new ordinance that permitted owners of wooden
laundries to obtain a license from the board subject to the
board's unlimited discretion.' The ordinance also prohibited the
use of rooftop scaffolding, a peculiarity of Chinese laundries,
without the board's permission. 9
The Chinese laundrymen ignored the legislation. In June of
1880, the police arrested a laundryman named Ah Din and
charged him with "maintaining a wooden laundry without hav-
241. See id. at 372-73.
242. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 100.
243. Id. (quoting the resolution proposed by Supervisor Charles Taylor, as reported
in the EVENING POST, Feb. 10, 1880, at 1). Another supervisor introduced a reso-
lution asking the city attorney to inform the board whether Chinese laundries could
be restricted to designated parts of the city and county. See id.
244. See id. at 100-01. The text of the order is reprinted in In re White, 7 P. 186,
186 (Cal. 1885).
245. See Gioia, supra note 47, at 214. The 10 laundries constructed of stone were
large businesses owned by whites. See id.
246. See id.
247. Indeed, the very fact that the ordinance was limited to laundries suggests
either an unreasonable reaction to the deadly fire or anti-Chinese animus. Laundries
were far from the only fire hazards in San Francisco. See id. ("4,390 of the 27,000
buildings in San Francisco were [constructed of] either brick or stone.").
248. See id. at 213. The Court declared this ordinance invalid in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), nearly six years after its enactment.
249. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 101.
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ing obtained the consent of the board of supervisors. " "O A police
court declared the legislation void because it deprived the defen-
dant of property without due process.251
Despite this decision, the city continued to enforce the law.
The police arrested another Chinese laundryman, Ah Ling, for
operating a wooden laundry.252 The police court convicted him,
but he appealed to the superior court, which held that the law
was unconstitutional. 253 The court found that the law tended to
create a monopoly, interfered with vested rights, and constituted
impermissible class legislation depriving the poor of the ability
to go into the laundry business.2' The decision also criticized the
unlimited discretion given to the supervisors.255
In October 1882, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors
passed an ordinance that again required laundry operators to
receive its permission to operate. In June of 1893, the board of
supervisors passed another ordinance that required laundry
operators to obtain certificates from the city health officer and
the board of fire wardens.25 Los Angeles promulgated a similar
law around the same time.257 The October 1882 ordinance went
into effect the following January, and the city quickly arrested
one hundred Chinese laundrymen for violating it.
258
Tom Tong, an arrested Chinese laundryman, filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, complaining that
none of the relevant public officials would grant him the authori-
zations he needed under the ordinance.259 A two-judge circuit
court panel heard the case. Circuit Judge Lorenzo Sawyer
260





254. See id. at 103.
255. See id. at 102-03.
256. See Gioia, supra note 47, at 213.
257. See Lou, The Chinese American Community, supra note 78, at 128.
258. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 106.
259. See id.
260. Judge Sawyer was generally very sympathetic to the Chinese during his ten-
ure on the circuit court. See Linda Przybyszewski, Judge Lorenzo Sawyer and the
Chinese: Civil Rights Decisions in the Ninth Circuit, 1 W. LEGAL HIST. 23, 54-56
(1988).
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were not a nuisance. District Judge Ogden Hoffman,2 61 the other
panel member, disagreed.6 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that it lacked jurisdiction.2 s
After the Ah Ling and Tom Tong decisions, San Francisco
ceased enforcing laundry licensing laws until 1885,2 when the
United State Supreme Court upheld maximum hours laws tar-
geted at Chinese laundries.265 Buoyed by these victories, Clarke,
San Francisco's attorney, moved to establish the validity of the
ordinances that required new laundries to be constructed of
brick or stone, Order 1559, and that required existing owners of
wooden laundries to obtain permission from the board of super-
visors to continue to operate, Order 1569.
Clarke found a cooperative white laundry owner, E. White,
willing to serve as a sham defendant. Clarke managed to per-
suade the California Supreme Court to affirm the validity of
Order 1559,26 and to secure a superior court ruling affirming
the validity of Order 1569.267 With Order 1569 pending before
the California Supreme Court, an attorney for the Chinese laun-
drymen filed an affidavit alleging that the White case was a
sham created by Clarke and therefore was not a true case and
controversy. The state supreme court dismissed the case.268
Following the California Supreme Court's decision affirming
Order 1559,269 dozens of Chinese laundrymen petitioned the
board of supervisors for permission to operate in wooden build-
ings.270 The supervisors denied each application.271 While the
authorities left white laundrymen unmolested, police began to
261. For more on Judge Hoffman, see CHRISTIAN G. FRrz, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN
CALIFORNIA: THE COURT OF OGDEN HOFFMAN, 1851-1891 (1991).
262. Although there is no published opinion, Sawyer recounted his views in In re
Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 473 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886). See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 323
n.50.
263. See Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 560 (1883).
264. See Gioia, supra note 47, at 214.
265. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
266. See In re White, 7 P. 186, 186 (Cal. 1885).
267. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 115.
268. See id. at 114-15 (suggesting that all parties involved decided to adjudicate
the issues in another proceeding, instead of in White).
269. See White, 7 P. at 186.
270. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 115.
271. See id.
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arrest unlicensed Chinese laundrymen." 2 One failed applicant,
Yick Wo, was arrested in August for operating his laundry with-
out permission." Yick Wo's attorneys filed a habeas corpus
petition and the case found its way to the California Supreme
Court in In re Yick Wo.
274
Although Yick Wo had received certificates from the city
health officer and fire warden attesting that his laundry met
local sanitary and fire standards, the court held that the law
was a proper exercise of the police power.2 5 Laundries, the court
stated, posed a risk of fire.2" The supervisors properly did not
consider themselves bound by the advice of the fire warden
when protecting the public from risk.2 The court tersely reject-
ed Yick Wo's claim that his Fourteenth Amendment rights had
been violated. Such a claim, the Court found, could not succeed
after Barbier v. Connolly and Soon Hing v. Crowley. s
Soon after Yick Wo lost his case, a local court convicted an-
other Chinese laundryman, Wo Lee, for operating his laundry
without the permission of the supervisors.279 His attorneys im-
mediately filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
circuit court.28 0 Judge Sawyer, who heard the case, condemned
the law: "The necessary tendency, if not the specific purpose, of
this ordinance, and of enforcing it in the manner indicated in
the record, is to drive out of business all the numerous small
laundries, especially those owned by Chinese.... 281 Judge Saw-
yer suggested that because the law clearly was intended to drive
the Chinese out of business, it violated the constitutional rights
of the laundrymen. 282 He refused, however, to free Wo Lee or to
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. 9 P. 139 (Cal. 1886).
275. See id. at 141.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 146.
279. See In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 471 (C.C.D. Cal.), rev'd sub nom. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
280. See id. at 471.
281. Wo Lee, 26 F. at 474.
282. See id.
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enjoin enforcement of the ordinance.2a Judge Sawyer instead
deferred to the California Supreme Court on grounds of comity.2"
On consolidated appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court
unanimously reversed Yick Wo and Wo Lee.2"' First, the Court
suggested that the law was facially unconstitutional because it
left laundrymen at the mercy of the "purely personal and arbi-
trary power"8 ' of the supervisors to grant or deny a license.87
Having one's livelihood be at the mercy of "the mere will of an-
other," added the Court, "seems to be intolerable in any country
where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."288
The Court found, however, that it did not need to reach the
issue of whether the law was facially invalid as a violation of
due process because the law, as applied, clearly discriminated
against the Chinese. The Court wrote:
[Tihe facts shown establish an administration directed so
exclusively against a particular class of persons... with a
mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical
denial by the State of that equal protection of the laws which
is secured to the petitioners ... by the broad and benign
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.28 9
Justice Matthew, writing for the Court, then proclaimed a last-
ing principle in American constitutional law:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practi-
cally to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.2"
283. See id. at 476-77.
284. See i& at 475.
285. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
286. Id at 370.
287. See id.
288. I&
289. Id. at 373.
290. Id. at 373-74.
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The Court noted that San Francisco's public health and fire
safety officers inspected and approved Yick Wo and Wo Lee's
laundries. 29 The only reason the city gave for its refusal to allow
Yick Wo and Wo Lee to continue "their harmless and useful
occupation" was the "will of the supervisors."292 The supervisors
also withheld licenses from two hundred other Chinese-owned
laundries, while allowing eighty other laundries owned by
whites "to carry on the same business under similar condi-
tions."29' The Court concluded that this disparity could be ex-
plained only by "hostility to the race and nationality to which
the petitioners belong[ed." 294 The enforcement of the laundry
law, therefore, was an unconstitutional denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
After the Court decided Yick Wo, the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors amended all laundry ordinances to require that
licenses issue upon the grant of certificates by the health officer
and fire wardens.295 Under this policy, arrests and convictions of
Chinese laundrymen for violating laundry ordinances decreased
substantially, but remained common. 96
C. Zoning
The first major zoning ordinance directed at Chinese laun-
dries in 1882 was promulgated in San Francisco in 1882. The




295. See GENERAL ORDERS OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE CITY AND COUN-
TY OF SAN FRANCISCO 199-201 (n.p. 1888), cited in COURTNEY, supra note 64, at 74.
Yick Wo also curbed att6mpts to use licensing laws against Chinese laundrymen in
other cities, which increasingly posed a threat to the Chinese. For example, in Janu-
ary 1886, the Washington territorial legislature passed legislation giving cities and
towns the power to license laundries and ordering that aliens not be licensed. See
Jules Alexander Karlin, The Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Seattle, 1885-86, 39 PAC.
NORTHWEST Q. 103, 117 (1948).
296. See Gioia, supra note 47, at 219. The Chinese avoided conflict with the board
of Supervisors by not applying for the licenses required to run a steam laundry, and
instead, running only hand laundries. See Bernstein, supra note 105, at 97-98. A
Japanese laundryman, however, challenged the board's denial of a license to him all
the way to the Supreme Court. See id.
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intent of the law was to keep Chinese laundries out of residen-
tial neighborhoods. A few years later, municipalities tried to use
zoning ordinances to effectively ban Chinese laundries entirely.
Later still, general zoning laws, passed without discriminatory
intent, had a disproportionate negative impact on Chinese laun-
drymen.
1. San Francisco's 1880 Zoning Law
In San Francisco, Chinese laundrymen could establish their
businesses in either major shopping areas where potential cli-
ents worked or in 'residential neighborhoods where potential
clients lived. A business district location provided the advantage
of customer density and contributed to the business-like and
impersonal nature of the trade,2 97 which in turn limited white
hostility.25 On the other hand, residential neighborhoods fre-
quently had lower rents and less competition. Most laundrymen,
eager to avoid conflict with whites, initially set up shop in busi-
ness districts. As those areas became saturated, however, Chi-
nese entrepreneurs began to establish laundries in white resi-
dential neighborhoods."'
Hostility to Chinese laundries intensified when the Chinese
began to move their laundries into residential neighborhoods.
The establishment of Chinese laundries throughout the city led
to a substantial increase in the Chinese population in white
areas because the laundry workers and owners often lived in
their shops." Professor Ong estimates that over a thousand
Chinese laundry workers lived in white neighborhoods by 1880."01
White San Franciscans, though content to patronize laundries
in the business districts, began to complain that the Chinese
laundries were reducing property values in residential neighbor-
hoods.302 In May 1880, the board of supervisors passed an ordi-
297. See Ong, supra note 15, at 104-05.
298. See id.
299. See id at 105.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 104. Most likely, there was a division in opin-
ion between people who lived on the same block as a laundry, and whose property
values were therefore most at risk, and others who lived in the vicinity, who appre-
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nance that made it unlawful for any person to 'establish, main-
tain or carry on a laundry' °303 in the area where most Chinese
laundries were located without first obtaining the consent of the
board. °" The board would grant a license on the recommenda-
tion of at least twelve tax-paying citizens-which excluded Chi-
nese-who lived on the block."0 5 Los Angeles promulgated a
similar law around the same time.3°6
Opponents of the ordinance believed that, if upheld, the law
would destroy the Chinese laundry industry in San Francisco.
They were probably correct, as it appears that only one Chinese
laundryman managed to obtain the required signatures. Even in
that instance, the anti-Chinese "League of Deliverance" intimi-
dated signers into retracting their approval.0 7
Shortly aier San Francisco passed its zoning ordinance,
Quong Woo, an eight-year veteran of the laundry business, was
arrested for violating the ordinance.308 Quong Woo filed a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court in San Francis-
co. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field, sitting as a circuit
judge, granted the writ in In re Quong Woo. 0 9 Field reasoned
that licenses may not be used to prohibit occupations "which are
not injurious to public morals, nor offensive to the senses, nor
dangerous to the public health and safety.""0 Field noted that
Quong Woo was in the United States under a treaty with China
that entitled him to pursue any of the lawful trades without
hindrance.3 "1 Field concluded that:
[his liberty to follow any such occupation cannot be re-
strained by invalid legislation of any kind; certainly not by a
municipal ordinance that has no stronger ground for its en-
ciated the convenience of having a laundry nearby.
303. Id. at 101 (quoting San Francisco Board of Supervisors, Order No. 1569); see
Gioia, supra note 47, at 213.
304. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 101.
305. See In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229, 229-30 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
306. See Lou, The Chinese American Community, supra note 78, at 128. The Los
Angeles law apparently only applied to new laundries. Its fate is unknown.
307. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 104; Ong, supra note 15, at 112 n.59.
308. See Quong Woo, 13 F. at 229.
309. See id.
310. Id. at 233.
311. See id.
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actment than the miserable pretense that the business of a
laundry-that is, of washing clothes for hire-is against good
morals or dangerous to the public safety
12
Quong Woo thus established the important principle that laun-
dries were not public nuisances that could be regulated at will.
2. Other Anti-Chinese Laundry Zoning Ordinances in 1880s"
California
As we have seen, Yick Wo limited the ability of jurisdictions to
exclude Chinese laundries through licensing. Zoning ordinances
therefore became a favored tool in the effort to close down Chi-
nese laundries in California.
In July 1885, the Board of Trustees of Modesto prohibited the
operation of a laundry in any part of Modesto, except "west of
the railroad track and south of G street.""'3 Modesto authorities
arrested Hang Kie for violating this ordinance. Hang Kie filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court challenging
the law's constitutionality. 14 In In re Hang Kie,1 5 the California
Supreme Court found that the zoning ordinance was a police or
sanitary regulation within the state's constitutional powers.1 6
The court cited Moynier, Barbier, and Soon Hing in support of
this finding.
317
Professor Ong contends that Hang Kie was a crucial victory in
the campaign of harassment against Chinese laundries because
it gave local jurisdictions the right to control the location of
laundries. 8 Ong, however, almost certainly overestimates the
importance of Hang Kie.
A federal court decision soon trumped Hang Kie by invalidat-
ing a Stockton, California ordinance in November 1885.19 This
312. Md
313. In re Hang Kie, 10 P. 327, 327 (Cal. 1886).
314. See id
315. 10 P. 327 (Cal. 1886).
316. See iL. at 328-29.
317. See d. at 328.
318. See Ong, supra note 15, at 107.
319. Around the same time, the Watsonville town council adopted an ordinance
forbidding the washing of clothes within town limits. See LYDON, supra note 79, at
187. Santa Cruz passed a purported health ordinance regulating the disposal of
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ordinance required all laundries to move to a largely uninhabit-
ed part of the city. 2 ' Stockton's Chinese laundry owners raised
five thousand dollars to challenge the ordinance and hired a
white lawyer to represent them. 21 In January 1886, Stockton
police arrested every laundry owner in town for violating the
ordinance. 22 Local authorities arranged a test case with the
counsel for the Chinese32 before federal district judge Lorenzo
Sawyer.32
Judge Sawyer found that the ordinance was an unreasonable
regulation, observing that the law "does not regulate-it extin-
guishes."32 5 The ordinance, Sawyer added, "destroys... an es-
tablished ordinary business, harmless in itself, and indispens-
able to the comfort of civilized communities, and which cannot
be so conveniently, advantageously, or profitably carried on
elsewhere."3 26 "Indeed," Sawyer asserted, "if this ordinance be
valid, it is difficult to perceive what rights the people of Califor-
nia have which a municipal corporation is bound to respect."32 7
Sawyer explained that the actual purpose of the ordinance was
to force the Chinese out of Stockton. "[In order that they shall
go,"32 8 continued Sawyer, the city encroached on the "sacred
rights" of both white and Chinese residents. 9
Sawyer found that the ordinance violated the right to labor,
"one of the highest privileges and immunities secured by the
constitution to every American citizen, and to every person re-
siding within its protection."3 30 Moreover, because the ordinance
did not have a grandfather clause, it unconstitutionally deprived
established laundry owners of their property without due pro-
sewage in a way intended to discriminate against Chinese laundries. See DUNN,
supra note 88.
320. See MINNICK, supra note 20, at 143-45.
321. See id. at 146.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See In re Tie Loy (The Stockton Laundry Case), 26 F. 611 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886).
325. Id. at 612.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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cess of law."3' Sawyer concluded that "this sweeping, exclusive,
destructive, prohibitory ordinance, making it an offense to pur-
sue one of the most ordinary and necessary occupations," was
not within the state's police power.3 2
Judge Sawyer invalidated another anti-Chinese zoning ordi-
nance in In re Sam Kee.' Chinese laundryman Sam Kee was
arrested for violating a Napa, California ordinance that forbade
the maintenance of public laundries in a section of the city
where his laundry had operated for twenty years.3 4 Judge Saw-
yer found that Sam Kee's laundry was not a nuisance. 33 In the
court's judgment, the effect of the ordinance was "simply to
confiscate the property, and deprive its owner of it without due
process of law."3 6 Judge Sawyer added that the ordinance
abridges the liberty of the owner to select his own occupation
and his own methods in the pursuit of happiness, and there-
by prevents him from enjoying his rights, privileges, and im-
munities, and deprives him of equal protection of the laws
secured to every person by the constitution of the United
States."7
In support of his opinion, Sawyer cited his earlier opinion in Tie
Loy and the Supreme Court's opinion in Yick Wo, but conspicu-
ously failed to mention Hang Kie.
3. Zoning Ordinances in the 1890s
In 1890, San Francisco's Bingham Ordinance created a Chi-
nese ghetto in the city.38 Not aimed exclusively at laundries, the
ordinance prohibited any Chinese from locating, residing, or
carrying on a business anywhere outside a designated tract.3 9
331. See id. at 615.
332. I& The local newspaper editor reacted to the decision by writing that Judge
Sawyer "would not even be qualified as a rural police judge." MINNICK, supra note
20, at 148.
333. 31 F. 680 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
334. See id, at 680-81.
335. See id. at 681.
336. Id-
337. Id.
338. See San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance No. 2190 (Feb. 17, 1890).
339. See id,
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Those who lived or worked outside the ghetto at the time had
sixty days to move. 4"
Litigants soon challenged the ordinance before Judge Sawyer,
who made short work of it in In re Lee Sing.341 In an eloquent
opinion, Judge Sawyer denounced those who would
forcibly drive out a whole community of twenty-odd thousand
people, old and young, male and female, citizens of the Unit-
ed States, born on the soil, and foreigners of the Chinese
race, moral and immoral, good, bad, and indifferent, and
without respect to circumstances or conditions, from a whole
section of the city which they have inhabited, and in which
they have carried on all kinds of business appropriate to a
city, mercantile, manufacturing, and otherwise, for more than
40 years.4
2
Sawyer concluded that the ordinance was a direct violation of
the United States Constitution, the nation's statutes, and its
treaties with China. 43 Judge Sawyer stated that "any reason-
ably intelligent and well-balanced mind,"3 " would recognize this,
so he abjured formal legal analysis.'
Despite the reluctance of federal courts to uphold them, anti-
Chinese laundry zoning laws continued to proliferate in Califor-
nia. In 1892, the town of Chico passed a draconian ordinance
requiring a written permit from the town's board of directors
before an individual could open a public laundry outside two
designated areas of the municipality.3' The ordinance also re-
quired that no permit be granted unless the applicant obtained
the written consent of a majority of both the real property own-
ers within the block on which the laundry was to be established
and of those within the four immediately surrounding blocks.' v
340. See id.
341. 43 F. 359 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890); see also Charles J. McClain, In re Lee Sing.
The First Residential Segregation Case, 3 W. LEGAL HIST. 179, 193-95 (1990).




346. See Ex parte Sing Lee, 31 P. 245, 245-46 (Cal. 1892). For background on
Chico's anti-Chinese movement, see Shover, supra note 78, at 223-43.
347. See Sing Lee, 31 P. at 246.
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A Chinese laundryman named Sing Lee was arrested for violat-
ing this ordinance.34
The California Supreme Court heard the case and began its
opinion in Ex parte Sing Lee 9 by noting that a laundry is not
offensive or dangerous to the health of those living within its
vicinity.35 0 A locality, the court acknowledged, could adopt rea-
sonable public health or safety regulations regarding laundries,
such as those upheld in Moynier, Barbier, and Soon Hing; 51
however, "the ordinance which the petitioner here is charged
with violating is not of this character, and the restrictions which
it imposes upon the right to carry on a public laundry have no
tendency to promote the public health, or in any way to secure
the public comfort or safety."" 2 Rather, the court found, the ordi-
nance at issue left the right of a person to establish a public
laundry "to the unrestricted will and caprice" of local property
owners. 53 This condition not only interfered "with the inalien-
able right of such person to engage in a lawful occupation, but
also with the right of the owner of property to devote it to a
lawful purpose."35 The court cited In re Jacobs,55 a much-ma-
ligned precursor to Lochner v. New York, 56 for the proposition
348. See id. at 245.
349. 31 P. 245 (Cal. 1892).





355. 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). The law at issue in Jacobs regulated cigarmaking, but only
if it took place in a tenement dwelling. See id. at 103. The New York Court of Ap-
peals found that the law could not be construed as a valid health and safety mea-
sure under the police power. See id. at 112-13. The court concluded that the "law
was not intended to protect the health of those engaged in cigarmaking, as they are
allowed to manufacture cigars everywhere except in the forbidden tenement houses."
Id. at 113.
In fact, the New York Cigar Makers' Union, composed of German Jews, champi-
oned the law to eliminate competition from recent Eastern European Jewish immi-
grants who made cigars in their tenements. See William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities
of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Guilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767, 795.
As in many other cases, scholars have often missed the real motivation behind al-
leged health and safety regulation. See, e.g., John Roche, Entrepreneurial Liberty and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 LAB. HIST. 3, 23 (1963) ("Like many other pieces of
social legislation then and now, [the Jacobs law] was passed on an ad hoc basis, by
cigar-smoking legislators, and a cigar-smoking Governor . . .").
356. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Jacobs is considered the "outstanding case," prior to
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that liberty and property rights cannot be thus invaded by un-
reasonable laws disguised as police regulations. 57 In further
support of its decision, the court quoted extensively from Yick
Wo v. Hopkins 58 and In re Quong Woo. 3 9 As the court noted, the
law invalidated in Quong Woo was similar to the ordinance at
issue in all relevant respects.36
A federal court also ruled in favor of Chinese laundrymen in
In re Hong Wah.36 The sheriff of San Mateo County had impris-
oned Hong Wah for violating an ordinance limiting the parts of
the city of San Mateo where laundries could operate. 62 Approxi-
mately thirty percent of the city was off-limits to laundries. 3
The Hong Wah court acknowledged that the California Supreme
Court had upheld a similar ordinance in Hang Kie.3 "' The court
also noted, however, that the federal district court had reached a
contrary result in Sam Kee. 65 In addition, the court stated that
later precedent had eroded Hang Kie, perhaps to the extent that
the California Supreme Court would no longer follow it, and
therefore the court ruled in Hong Wah's favor. 66
After Sing Lee and Hong Wah, anti-laundry zoning became
less common, but the decisions did not deter all municipalities
from targeting the Chinese laundries. For example, Sacramento
passed an ordinance prohibiting laundry owners from renting
out space in a building not used solely for a laundry. 67 The law's
effect would be to drive small Chinese laundries out of
Sacramento's downtown, without affecting large, white-owned
commercial laundries, which owned their facilities.
Lochner, that protected liberty of contract. SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE
GENERAL-WELFARE STATE 156 (1956).
357. See Sing Lee, 31 P. at 246.
358. See id.
359. The court refers to this case as the Laundry Ordinance Case. See id. at 247.
360. See id.
361. 82 F. 623 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
362. See id. at 624.
363. See id.
364. See id. at 625 (citing In re Hang Kie, 10 P. 327 (Cal. 1886)).
365. See id. (citing In re Sam Kee, 31 F. 680 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887)).
366. See id at 626 (noting the conflict between Hang Me and the more recent
precedents of Ex parte Whitwell, 32 P. 870 (Cal. 1893) (invalidating a law regulating
insane asylums), and Ex parte Sing Lee, 31 P. 245 (Cal. 1892)).
367. See SACRAMENTO, CAL., ORDINANCE 824, § 3 (1907).
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In Ex parte San Chung,3 68 a Chinese laundryman argued that
the law was unconstitutional because it was unreasonable, was
discriminatory, and oppressive, restrained trade, and violated
his right to pursue his occupation without unlawful interference
or unnecessary restraint.369 The California Court of Appeals
rejected this challenge. The law was facially neutral, the court
wrote, and therefore did not discriminate against San Chung "as
an individual or as a member of the Mongolian race." 7 ° Mean-
while, under Barbier v. Connolly37 and Soon Hing v. Crowley,72
the law was a valid police power measure.373 The court also cited
favorably the California Supreme Court's opinion in Yick Wo,
but failed to note that the United States Supreme Court unani-
mously overruled that decision.7 4
4. The Threat from General Zoning Laws
San Chung was one of the last cases involving an intentional-
ly anti-Chinese laundry zoning ordinance. 75 A new threat to
Chinese laundries, however, soon arose from broad, generally
applicable zoning laws that did not take into account the
laundrymen's interests and circumstances. In 1911, Los Angeles
passed a zoning ordinance establishing residential districts cov-
ering most of the city. The ordinance prohibited conducting
and maintaining "works and factories," including laundries,
within the boundaries of such districts. 7 Many Chinese laundry
owners suddenly found themselves operating illegally. If the
Chinese had possessed political influence, they probably could
have won an exemption from the zoning law, as did other harm-
368. 105 P. 609 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1909).
369. See id. at 610.
370. Id. at 611.
371. 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
372. 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
373. See San Chung, 105 P. at 612.
374. See id.
375. In 1906, the town of Pacific Grove, California, "passed an ordinance prohibit-
ing any Chinese laundries from operating inside the town limits." LYDON, supra note
79, at 24445. The fate of this law is unknown.
376. See Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 21,996 (new series) (1911).
377. Id.
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less businesses. Instead, they sought to defend their interests
in court.
A laundryman named Quong Wo was arrested for continuing
to run his laundry in a residential district in Ex parte Quong
Wo. 319 Quong Wo's attorney filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. Seven people
residing near the laundry signed affidavits stating that the "op-
eration of the laundry has not in any way affected their safety,
comfort, or welfare, or, to their knowledge, that of any resident
in the neighborhood."80 The California Supreme Court noted
that the ordinance was facially neutral.3 " l The court refused to
find that the law was being applied unequally, even though
Quong Wo's attorney demonstrated that several white-owned
steam laundries continued to operate unmolested in the same
residential district.38 2 The court also held that the ordinance in
question did not illegally confer arbitrary authority on the city
to exempt certain businesses from the ordinance, as in Yick
Wo.3  The city's exemption of certain small pieces of land con-
taining factories and other businesses from the ordinances did
not prove "unreasonable discrimination."3
Finally, the court addressed what it considered Quong Wo's
"main contention": that the laundry business is a "lawful and
necessary occupation" 35 that may not be confined within defined
limits in a city or town.38 6 The court decided that even if a laun-
dry is not a nuisance, it can be excluded from certain parts of a
city if "necessary for the safety, health, and comfort of society at
large,"87 a principle established in Hang Kie.88 The court also
378. See ELMER C. SANDmEYER, THE ANTI-CHNESE MOvEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 41
(Illini Books 1973) (1939).
379. 118 P. 714, 715-16 (Cal. 1911).








388. See id. at 718 (citing In re Hang Kie, 10 P. 327 (Cal. 1886)). The court distin-
guished Ex parte Sing Lee, 31 P. 245 (Cal. 1892), on the ground that the ordinance
involved in Sing Lee essentially banned laundries throughout the city, not just in
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relied on Ex parte San Chung38 9 in support of its view that laun-
dries may be regulated because they can spread disease to near-
by residents, M even though Los Angeles had not presented any
evidence on this point.
Another challenge to Los Angeles's zoning ordinance came
before the California Court of Appeals in 1919 in Sam Kee v.
Wilde. 9' By this time, the city had amended the ordinance so
that industrial districts, where "works and factories" were al-
lowed to operate, could be established by petition if enough local
residents agreed.892 Owners of various local businesses and facto-
ries persuaded their neighbors to consent to the creation of mini-
industrial districts composed entirely of the nonconforming prop-
erty.
3 93
Laundrymen Sam Kee and Hop Wah, however, failed to per-
suade their neighbors to consent to an industrial district com-
posed of their respective laundries.3 9 They sued the Clerk of Los
Angeles County for refusing to renew their licenses. The plain-
tiffs argued that the relevant ordinances were "void and uncon-
stitutional" to the extent that they affected the laundry busi-
ness. 95 The Superior Court of Los Angeles County agreed and
ruled in plaintiff's favor.
96
On appeal, however, the court of appeals reversed and upheld
the ordinances on the strength of various United States Su-
preme Court and California Supreme Court decisions affirming
the constitutionality of zoning laws. Among the cases cited by
the court were the laundry cases of Quong Wo, Moynier, Soon
residential areas. See Quong Wo, 118 P. at 718 (citing Sing Lee, 31 P. at 246).
389. 105 P. 609 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1909).
390. See Quong Wo, 118 P. at 719.
391. 183 P. 164 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919).
392. See id. at 164-65 (discussing Ordinance Nos. 26,555 and 22,798, which pre-
scribed the procedure for petitioning the city council to establish industrial and resi-
dential districts).
393. See id.
394. The appellate court accepted respondents argument that Hop Wah and Sam
Kee failed to acquire the necessary signatures; however, it noted that the lower
"court failed altogether to find upon the issue . .. as to whether or not the petition-
er prepared and endeavored to obtain signatures." Id. at 165.
395. Id.
396. See id.
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Hing, and Barbier"9 The court did not bother to distinguish-or
even cite-federal decisions invalidating the zoning ordinances
previously challenged by Chinese laundrymen.
D. Special Laundry Taxes
Another common anti-Chinese measure was a special tax on
laundries, designed to apply mainly or solely to Chinese laun-
dries. These taxes were common throughout the West, especially
in Montana, until the Montana Supreme Court finally held that
these special taxes were unconstitutional in 1913.
1. Early Laundry Taxes: 1860s-1870s
Perhaps the first anti-Chinese laundry ordinance was a laun-
dry tax passed by the Portland City Council in 1864.98 Begin-
ning in 1869, Montana subjected Chinese laundrymen to a harsh
laundry tax399 that forced the Chinese to forfeit twenty-five per-
cent of their gross earnings.40 The law was facially neutral, but
its intent "was obviously discriminatory."40 ' Eventually, perhaps
because of an adverse court ruling, the Montana Territory
ceased enforcing the tax. 
402
In 1873, San Francisco passed an ordinance requiring laun-
dries employing one horse-drawn vehicle to pay two dollars per
quarter, those employing two such vehicles to pay four dollars
per quarter, and those employing none to pay fifteen dollars per
quarter.40" This schedule had clear discriminatory implications
397. See id. at 166.
398. See Holden, supra note 32, at 198 n.15. A county court ultimately invalidated
this tax. See id.
399. See Mont. Territory, Legislative Assembly, Laws, Memorials and Resolutions of
the Territory of Montana, 6th Sess., § 16, at 55 (1870); Montana Territory, Legis-
lative Assembly, Laws, Memorials and Resolutions of the Territory of Montana, 5th
Sess., § 20, at 61 (1869).
400. See ROBERT E. WYNNE, REACTION TO THE CHINESE IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
AND BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1850 TO 1910, at 62 (Arno Press 1978) (1964); Larry D.
Quinn, "Chink Chink Chinaman": The Beginning of Nativism in Montana, 58 PAC.
NORTHWEST Q. 82, 88 (1967).
401. Robert R. Swartout, Jr., Kwangtung to Big Sky: The Chinese in Montana 1864-
1900, MONT.: MAG. W. HIST., Winter 1988, at 42, 51 n.46.
402. See generally In re Yot Sang, 75 F. 983, 985 (D. Mont. 1896) (holding a later
laundry license tax unconstitutional).
403. See San Francisco Bd. of Supervisors Order No. 1098 (June 23, 1873), noted in
262 [Vol. 41:211
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because almost all of the Chinese laundries came under the
third classification.4 '
In February 1874, thirteen Chinese laundrymen were arrested
for failing to pay the fifteen dollar quarterly license fee.4' 5 A
local court declared the ordinance invalid because it violated the
equal protection of the laws by "discriminat[ing] unjustly against
the poor, wantonly and unnecessarily add[ing] to their burden,
and substantially prohibit[ing] them from the pursuit of a useful
and worthy calling."40 6 The court declined to reach the issue of
intentional discrimination against the Chinese, explaining that
"this court had nothing to do with the secret motives or inten-
tions of the body which passed the order." ° The board of super-
visors repealed the law on February 24, 1874, and replaced it
with a nondiscriminatory tax.4°8
In 1876, however, the board of supervisors passed a new li-
cense tax identical to the tax of 1873. On May 2, 1876, a state
district court declared this measure unconstitutional.40 9 The
court found the San Francisco tax to be unreasonable and that it
illicitly discriminated against poor launderers.41  This court,
Gioia, supra note 47, at 213.
404. See A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 16, at 24;
SANDMEYER, supra note 378, at 52.
405. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 51; see also COURTNEY, supra note 64, at 57;
A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 16, at 24. This was a com-
panion measure to the infamous Queue Ordinance, which required that all people in
jail must have their hair cut to an inch in length. This ordinance was meant to ha-
rass the Chinese, who generally wore their hair in a long braid. See SANDMEYER,
supra note 378, at 52. The United States Circuit Court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutional in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879)
(No. 6456) (finding the requirement that Chinese prisoners must have their hair cut
under the Queue Ordinance amounted to 'cruel and unusual punishment").
406. Chinese Laundry Ordinance: It Is Declared Void by Judge Stanly, EVENING
BULL. (San Francisco), July 9, 1874, at 3 [hereinafter Chinese Laundry Ordinance]
(publishing Judge Stanly's opinion in People v. Soon Kung).
407. Id.
408. See San Francisco Bd. of Supervisors Order No. 1135 (Feb. 24, 1874), noted in
Gioia, supra note 47, at 213.
409. See The Laundrymen's License: The Excessive License Imposed upon Laundry-
men Declared Void, People v. Hung Hai, DAILY ALTA CAL. (San Francisco), May 3,
1876, at 1 [hereinafter The Laundrymen's License]; see also BENJAMIN S. BROOKS,
BRIEF OF THE LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION TOUCHING THE CHINESE QUESTION,
REFERRED TO THE JOINT COMMISSION OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS 86 (San Fran-
cisco Women's Co-operative Printing Union 1877).
410. See The Laundrymen's License, supra note 409, at 1 (publishing Judge McKee's"
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unlike its predecessor, held that it was entitled to inquire into
the ulterior motives of the supervisors and to invalidate a law
passed to oppress the Chinese." The court did not reach the
issue of anti-Chinese animus, however, because the court found
the law to be void on its face. The board of supervisors repealed
the law on May 1, 1878, and promulgated a new nondiscrimina-
tory tax.4 2
Meanwhile, the discriminatory taxation of Chinese laundries
spread to Los Angeles. Throughout the 1860s and 1870s, the
Chinese dominated the growing laundry industry in Los Angel-
es. In 1872, the Chinese owned eleven of the thirteen wash-
houses in the city.413 The city council passed a five dollar per
month tax that nominally applied to all businesses in the city
but was enforced only against Chinese laundrymen.414 The city
temporarily stopped enforcing the tax against laundry owners
when they refused to pay, and the city's attorneys warned
against taking action only against the laundries.4 5 Under public
pressure, however, the city renewed its enforcement of the tax.
The Chinese chose to accept the tax as a cost of doing business
rather than raise the money needed to fight a costly legal bat-
tle.
416
In the 1878 city elections, the anti-Chinese Workingman's
Party won twelve of fifteen city council seats. The party had
pledged to use discriminatory taxes to drive the Chinese out of
the city.417 By this time, Chinese laundries employed three hun-
dred Chinese and outnumbered non-Chinese laundries approxi-
mately ten to one.418 In January 1879, the city council passed an
ordinance taxing "regular' laundries... as differentiated from
'poor women who do washing,' twenty five dollars per month.419
Rumors circulated that the "wily Mongolians" were plotting to
order declaring tax unconstitutional in People v. Hung Hai).
411. See id.
412. See Gioia, supra note 47, at 213.
413. See Lou, The Chinese American Community, supra note 78, at 125.
414. See id. at 120, 126.
415. See id. at 126-27.
416. See id. at 127.
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establish an enormous laundry under one roof, thereby having to
pay only one tax.420
Faced with the threat of litigation from the laundry owners,
the council reduced the fees on laundries to six dollars per
month, a fee the laundrymen quietly accepted. With legal ha-
rassment of Chinese laundries in check, their numbers grew
from eleven in 1872 to fifty-two in 1890, despite an 1886 boycott
organized by labor unions.42'
Anti-Chinese laundry taxation spread even to remote frontier
towns such as Prescott, Arizona. By the late 1870s, thirty of the
ninety-nine Chinese in Prescott worked as laundrymen.4' The
village council passed a law that required keepers or owners of
laundries to pay a licensing tax of ten dollars per quarter.4'
2. Laundry Taxes in the 1880s
In late 1884, the City of Portland, Oregon passed an ordi-
nance requiring laundry owners to pay a quarterly license of five
dollars.4 4 Wan Yin, the proprietor of a washhouse in Portland,
refused to pay the fee and was arrested.425 He filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus challenging his imprisonment.426 In In re
Wan Yin,4 27 federal district judge Matthew Deady, a champion of
Chinese rights,428 declared the law unconstitutional.429 Judge
Deady acknowledged that Portland had the power to tax offen-
sive trades, but he found that "washing is a useful and inoffen-
420. Id.
421. See Lou, Chinese-American Agricultural Workers, supra note 78, at 49, 58 &
307 n.9. The organizers called for a boycott of both Chinese-owned businesses and
white-owned businesses that employed Chinese. See id. at 310 n.60. White-owned
laundries evaded the boycott completely by falsely advertising that they had dis-
missed their Chinese employees. See id.
422. See Lister & Lister, supra note 43, at 45.
423. See id. at 57.
424. See Portland, Or., Ordinance 4448 (Dec. 4, 1884).
425. gee In re Wan Yin (The Laundry License Case), 22 F. 701, 702 (D. Or. 1885).
426. See id.
427. The Laundry License Case, 22 F. 701 (D. Or. 1885).
428. See Ralph J. Mooney, Matthew Deady and the Federal Judicial Response to
Racism in the Early West, 63 O. L. REV. 561, 627-37 (1984).
429. See Wan Yin, 22 F. at 705.
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sive occupation."430 The only reason that the city found it offen-
sive, the court continued, was because laundering was "princi-
pally performed by the Chinese."4sl Judge Deady noted that
"while this circumstance may excite race prejudice, it by no
means makes the business 'offensive' to the senses."4 2
3. More Laundry Taxes in Montana
Beginning in 1895, the Chinese again faced discriminatory
taxation in Montana, where Chinese men were finding particu-
lar success in the laundry business.' A Montana statute re-
quired every male engaged in the hand laundry business to pay
a license fee of ten dollars per quarter; if the owner had one or
more employees, the license fee rose to twenty-five dollars.'
The law exempted steam laundries and female-operated hand
laundries, all of which were owned by whites.435
430. Id. at 704.
431. Id.
432. Id. Laundry taxes proliferated elsewhere in the West in the 1880s. For exam-
ple, in Port Townsend, Chinese laundrymen successfully launched a court battle
against a $20 annual tax that applied only to them. See Liestman, supra note 80, at
95-96. Deadwood and Spearfish, South Dakota, each passed laundry license ordinanc-
es in 1885. See Liestman, supra note 47, at 76-77. Local courts apparently over-
turned these ordinances. See id. Phoenix also passed a laundry license tax in early
1886. See BRADFORD LUCKINGHAM, MINORITIES IN PHOENIX 87 (1994). The local
courts apparently upheld this law as well. See id.
433. For example, in Butte in 1890, the Chinese had four laundries. See Lee, supra
note 47, at 51. By 1895, this grew to 18, and reached a peak of 31 in 1900 and
1905, declining to 20 during the years from 1910 to 1920, and then declining further
after that. See id. Laundries constituted more than one-third of Chinese businesses
in Butte during this period. Moreover, the Chinese dominated the laundry industry
in Butte. In 1895, the ratio of Chinese to American laundries was 18:11; in 1900,
31:9; in 1905, 31:5; in 1910, 20:7; in 1915, 21:7; and in 1920, 20:7. See id- at 53. In
a later work, Lee suggests that these figures for Chinese laundries are substantial
underestimates because many Chinese laundries were unlicensed. See LEE, supra
note 78, at 194.
434. See MONT. POL. CODE § 4709 (Wilbur F. Sanders 1895). The City of Butte
passed its own laundry ordinance in 1894, which seems to have been the model for
the state law. See LEE, supra note 78, at 144. The Butte law required "'that all
male persons in the city who are now or shall hereafter engage in the laundry busi-
ness shall pay a licen[sle of $5 per quarter." Id. at 114 (quoting the Butte ordi-
nance).
435. See Lee, supra note 47, at 53; Swartout, supra note 401, at 51 n.46. At this
time, "home laundries" operated by white women were numerous and these home
1999] LOCHNER, PARITY, AND THE CHINESE LAUNDRY CASES 267
Two Chinese laundrymen unsuccessfully challenged the law in
separate cases in Montana state court. e Another Chinese laun-
dryman, however, emerged victorious in federal district court. 7
Although the Supreme Court reversed the latter decision on pro-
cedural grounds, the Court did not disturb the lower court's
holding that the law was unconstitutional on its merits."8
In 1908, Montana inaugurated a tax of ten dollars per quarter
on laundries. 9 Like the earlier statute, this statute exempted
steam laundries and self-employed laundresses."6 Essentially,
the statute applied solely to Chinese laundrymen.
Quong Wing, a Chinese laundryman, challenged the law in
Quong Wing v. Kirkendall,"1 but the Montana Supreme Court
ruled against him. 24' The court held that the law was reason-
able, particularly in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Muller v. Oregon,,' which upheld protective legisla-
tion for women.4"
In an opinion written by Justice Holmes, the Court affirmed
the Montana Supreme Court's opinion.' Holmes reasoned that
a "[sitate does not deny the equal protection of the laws merely
by adjusting its revenue laws and taxing system in such a way
as to favor certain industries or forms of industry." Thus, laws
preferring steam laundries to hand laundries were permissible.
Moreover, added Holmes, Muller established the constitutional-
laundries were gradually absorbed by the steam laundries. See Lee, supra note 47,
at 53.
436. See State v. Camp Sing, 44 P. 516 (Mont. 1896); State ex rel. Toi v. French,
41 P. 1078, 1079 (Mont. 1895). For greater detail, see Bernstein, supra note 105, at
95-101.
437. See In re Yot Sang, 75 F. 983 (D. Mont. 1896). For details, see Bernstein,
supra note 105, at 98.
438. See In re Yot Sang, 171 U.S. 686 (1898) (per curiam).
439. See MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 2776 (Smith 1908).
440. See id.
441. 101 P. 250 (Mont. 1909), affd, 223 U.S. 59 (1912) (affirming the Montana Su-
preme Court's ruling in favor of the defendant, but allowing the plaintiff to raise
issues on remand which the plaintiff disclaimed during the appeal). For more details
on this litigation, see Bernstein, supra note 105, at 95-101.
442. See Quong Wing, 101 P. at 252.
443. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
444. See id. at 423.
445. See Quong Wing, 223 U.S. at 64-65.
446. Id. at 62.
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ity of regulatory legislation granting women special
protections. 4 7
Holmes noted that Quong Wing's counsel had not raised the
issue of racial discrimination."' Holmes specified that if the law
were targeted solely at the Chinese," 9 as it seems to have been
by its limited application to hand laundries, it would be uncon-
stitutional under Yick Wo.
45 °
The Court remanded the case to the state district court, where
Quong Wing provided evidence that the statute in question af-
fected only Chinese laundrymen.4" The district court therefore
declared the statute unconstitutional, 452 a determination reluc-
tantly affirmed by Montana's supreme court.4
4. Threatened Taxation in New York During the Great
Depression
As the Chinese population spread throughout the United
States, the threat of discriminatory legislation followed them. In
1933, the New York city council proposed an ordinance that
would have required all public laundries to pay a license fee of
twenty-five dollars per year and to post a one thousand dollar
security bond.4  These provisions were intended to drive small
laundries out of business. 455 Another provision of the proposed
legislation would have banned aliens from owning laundries.4 6
Most Chinese laundry owners either could not afford the fees,
were not American citizens due to discriminatory naturalization
laws, or faced both problems. 457 The Chinese laundrymen orga-
nized to oppose the proposed ordinance and hired a white lawyer
to represent them politically.48 The lawyer persuaded the coun-
447. See id. at 63 (citing Muller).
448. See id.
449. See id.
450. See id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
451. See Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 130 P. 2, 2 (Mont. 1913).
452. See id.
453. See id.




458. See id. at 42-43.
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cil to reduce the license fee to ten dollars and the bond to one
hundred dollars, and to exempt "Orientals" from the citizenship
requirement.459
The proposed New York law, along with In re Mark, ° repre-
sented the tail end of the era of harassment of Chinese laun-
dries. Once the United States entered World War H, with China
as an ally, anti-Chinese sentiment diminished considerably.461
Meanwhile, relatively few American-born Chinese, who were
American citizens by constitutional right, entered the laundry
business." 2
The legacy of the laundry cases, however, lives on in their
influence on American constitutional law. For instance, Yick Wo
v. Hopkins is one of the most famous cases in American consti-
tutional history, and other Chinese laundry cases played small-
er, but meaningful, roles in the development of constitutional
doctrine. The next two sections of this Article discuss the lessons
that can be learned from the history of the laundry laws and the
judicial reaction to them.
Il. CHINESE LAUNDRY CASES AND THE PARITY DEBATE
Scholars have long debated whether federal courts are institu-
tionally more able and more willing to protect federal constitu-
tional rights than are state courts; this is known as the "parity"
debate.4" The debate was triggered by the Supreme Court's
statement in Stone v. Powell' that "there is 'no intrinsic reason
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him
more competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to
[constitutional claims] than his neighbor in the state court-
house."'
Professor Burt Neuborne responded to this dictum with an
influential article detailing the following perceived advantages of
459. See id.
460. 58 P.2d 913 (Cal. 1936).
461. See DANIELS, supra note 89, at 188-99.
462. See Li, supra note 107, at 38-39.
463. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 233 (1988).
464. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
465. Id. at 494 n.35 (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963)).
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federal courts over state courts as protectors of federal constitu-
tional rights: (1) The federal bench is a far more elitist institu-
tion than is the state bench and attracts more competent, dili-
gent judges; (2) federal judges specialize in federal law, includ-
ing federal constitutional law; (3) federal judges enjoy life ten-
ure, and therefore are insulated from majoritarian pressures;
and (4) federal judges have a psychological bias in favor of pro-
tecting federal constitutional rights. They are more likely than
state judges to see enforcing the federal Constitution as their
responsibility, while state judges are more likely to be jealous of
state authority.
466
By contrast, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky argues that federal
courts are not an inherently superior forum in which to protect
federal constitutional rights.467 Chemerinsky believes that the
preference among academics for federal enforcement of federal
constitutional rights arose in the historical context of the
1950s.468 At that time, federal courts were dramatically expand-
ing civil rights and civil liberties protections at the expense of
state power. 69 Given the radical nature of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence at that time and given the extent to which that
jurisprudence trampled on traditional state prerogatives, "there
was reason to question whether state courts would follow
these... requirements."47 Meanwhile, the federal courts were
dominated by Democrats and liberal Republicans, who were
thought to be "more likely to enforce desegregation, apply consti-
tutional criminal procedure protections, and follow Warren
Court decisions than were their state counterparts."471
466. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, supra note 2, at 1121-28; see also
Neuborne, Parity Revisited, supra note 2, at 798 (arguing that despite changes, dis-
parity continues).
467. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 598-
600 (1991). For similar views, see Barry Friedman, 12 CONST. COMMENT 441, 448-50
(1995) (reviewing LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS (1994)).
468. See Chemerinsky, supra note 467, at 596.
469. See id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 597; see also Friedman, supra note 467, at 449 ("While the federal
courts were unquestionably the place to be in the 1960's and 1970's, that has not
always been true in the past and may not be true today."). Friedman also notes
that often 'It]hose who prefer federal courts to vindicate federal rights also have a
selective view of what those rights should be." Friedman, supra note 467, at 450.
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In this historical context, Chemerinsky adds, "[tihe assump-
tion of a lack of parity between federal and state courts is not
surprising."472 In more normal circumstances, however,
Chemerinsky believes that the argument that federal courts are
more likely to protect federal constitutional rights is weak. For
example, in 1991, when Chemerinsky was writing, conservative
Reagan and Bush appointees, thought to be relatively hostile to
expansive interpretations of federal constitutional rights, domi-
nated the federal bench. Chemerinsky contends that there is no
reason to believe that these judges would be more protective of
federal constitutional rights than state judges would be.47
Professor Larry Yackle, however, agrees with Professor
Neuborne that federal courts are better forums for the vindica-
tion of rights than are state courts.474 He argues that "[we do
not depend entirely on the ideological make-up of individual
sitting judges to give federal rights a generous interpretation;
we also rely, even more fundamentally, on the competence, per-
spective, and institutional location and structure of the federal
courts."475
The history of the Chinese laundry litigation provides evi-
dence favoring the anti-parity position. Federal courts were far
more likely than state courts to rule in favor of Chinese petition-
ers. With one glaring exception,476 final federal court rulings in
Chinese laundry cases unanimously favored the Chinese laun-
drymen.477 Final state court rulings, by contrast, overwhelmingly
The discussion here assumes no particular view of what rights should be protected.
472. Chemerinsky, supra note 467, at 597.
473. See i at 598-99; see also Friedman, supra note 467, at 450-51 ("Many state
courts recently have demonstrated a willingness to protect rights that far exceeds
that of the federal courts. Civil liberties lawyer[s] today are going to think long and
hard about which court system to use, at least in states in which the state constitu-
tion is being revitalized.").
474. See LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURS 44 (1994).
475. Id. at 50.
476. See Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885); cf Quong Wing v. Kirkendall,
223 U.S. 59 (1912) (upholding Montana laundry regulation but suggesting sua sponte
that the law was unconstitutional).
477. See, e.g., Yick We. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Yee Gee v. City of San
Francisco, 235 F. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1916); In re Hong Walh, 82 F. 623 (N.D. Cal. 1897);
In re Sam Kee, 31 F. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1887): In re Lie Toy (The Stockton Laundry
Case), 26 F. 611 (D. Cal. 1886); In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); In
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favored the government. State courts upheld the challenged laws
in eleven of the seventeen cases decided by state courts.478 In
contrast, state courts invalidated the challenged laws in only six
of the seventeen cases.479
At first blush, the greater protection the federal courts gave to
the Chinese might appear to be due to historical circumstance.
Federal judges felt obligated to assert federal authority over
immigration and to establish the federal government's authority
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against the states in the
post-Civil War era. In other words, federal judges wanted to
preserve the power that the national government successfully
asserted during the Civil War.
Certainly, this consideration influenced federal judges. For
example, with regard to immigration, the Burlingame Treaty
required the United States government to permit Chinese immi-
gration and to protect Chinese residents of the United States.8 °
White Californians reacted by attempting to regulate immigra-
tion directly through state law.481 When courts invalidated direct
re Yot Sang, 75 F. 983 (D. Mont. 1896); In re Wan Yin (The Laundry License Case),
22 F. 701 (D. Or. 1885).
478. See, e.g., Ex parte Wng Wing, 138 P. 695 (Cal. 1914); Ex parte Quong Wo,
118 P. 714 (Cal. 1911); In re Hang Kie, 10 P. 327 (Cal. 1889); In re Yick Wo, 9 P.
139 (Cal. 1886); Sam Kee v. Wilde, 183 P. 164 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919); Ex parte
San Chung 105 P. 609 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1909); In re White, 6 W. Coast Rep. 644
(Cal. 1885); Territory v. Ah Choy, 17 Haw. 331 (1906); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall,
101 P. 250 (Mont. 1909); State v. Camp Sing, 44 P. 516 (Mont. 1896); State ex rel.
Toi v. French, 41 P. 1078 (Mont. 1895).
479. See, e.g., In re Mark, 58 P.2d 913 (Cal. 1936); Ex parte Sing Lee, 31 P. 245
(Cal. 1892); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 130 P. 2 (Mont. 1913) (ruling in favor of
laundryman only because of direction by United States Supreme Court); In re Woo
Yeck, 12 Pac. Coast L.J. 382 (Alameda Super. Ct. 1883); People v. Hung Hal, in The
Laundrymen's License, supra note 409, at 1; People v. Soon Kung, in Chinese Laun-
dry Ordinance, supra note 406, at 3.
480. See Additional Articles to the Treaty Between the United States and the Ta-
Tsing Empire, July 28, 1868, U.S.-China, art. VI, 16 Stat. 739, 740.
481. In 1852, for example, California passed an act requiring that each owner or
master of a vessel bringing passengers to California to post a bond of five hundred
dollars for every alien passenger landed or pay a commutation fee of five dollars to
the state hospital fund. See CAL. POL. CODE, ch. 1, art. 7 (1887). This act was even-
tually declared unconstitutional in People v. S.S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578 (1872),
and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876). In 1855, California passed a law
even more directly targeted at Chinese immigration to discourage them from moving
to California because they could not become citizens. See People v. Downer, 7 Cal.
272
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regulations, anti-Chinese forces tried to harass the Chinese into
leaving. Supervisor Goodwin of San Francisco, the author of
some of the early laundry legislation and other anti-Chinese
measures, argued that only local legislation could discourage
excessive Chinese immigration because of the federal
government's treaty with China.482
Not surprisingly, federal judges saw anti-Chinese legislation
as an attempt to exercise control over immigration, a power that
belonged solely to the national government. Federal district
judge Matthew Deady of Oregon concluded that Western anti-
Chinese legislation "is but a poorly disguised attempt on the
part of the state to evade and set aside the treaty with China,
and thereby nullify an act of the national government."4a He
directly analogized state discrimination against the Chinese to
the South's rebellion, arguing that between the anti-Chinese
legislation "and 'the firing on Fort Sumter,' by South Carolina,
there is the difference of the direct and indirect-and nothing
more."4 Deady concluded by warning state officials that the
question of whether the Chinese should be allowed in the coun-
try was not a state matter, "but one which belongs solely to the
national government.4 8
One can speculate that a desire to assert federal authority
over immigration influenced the votes of at least some of the
Supreme Court Justices in Yick Wo v. Hopkins. Less than two
years before it decided Yick Wo, the Supreme Court twice unani-
mously upheld a maximum hours law that was clearly designed
to harm Chinese laundrymen.8 6 Yet the Yick Wo Court unani-
mously invalidated a discriminatory laundry licensing law.487
One could-as the Court did--explain this apparent anomaly by
169, 169 (1857). This law required the master or owner of each vessel with Chinese
immigrants aboard to pay a $50 tax on each passenger landed. See id. at 170, 170
(discussing California's anti-immigration law of 1855). This law was declared uncon-
stitutional in Downer. See id. at 170-71.
482. See EAVES, supra note 29, at 144.
483. Baker v. Portland, 2 F. Cas. 472, 475 (D. Or.) (No. 777).
484. I1&
485. Id. at 474.
486. See Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S.
27 (1885).
487. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
simply distinguishing the ordinances at issue.488 While one can
easily see how the differences between the licensing and the
hours ordinances could lead some of the Justices to change their
votes, it is less clear why these differences should have resulted
in a switch from a 9-0 vote against the Chinese to a 9-0 vote in
their favor.
489
Perhaps, then, the most important external events that oc-
curred between Soon Hing and Yick Wo help explain the Court's
turn around. In late 1885 and early 1886, vicious anti-Chinese
riots broke out throughout the West.4" The riots killed or
wounded dozens of Chinese and forced thousands to flee their
homes.49' These riots were a clear challenge to federal authority,
as the rioters sought to drive aliens who were under federal
protection from the country.492 It is entirely possible that in
unanimously deciding Yick Wo, the Supreme Court was sending
a message to the West that the status of the Chinese would be
decided through federal law, not local oppression.
Federal judges also were eager to establish federal authority
over the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Deady
of Oregon faced severe public criticism for granting habeas cor-
pus writs to several Chinese immigrants imprisoned under un-
constitutional legislation.493 In the 1885 laundry license case, In
re Wan Yin,4 ' Deady defended his exercise of habeas corpus
jurisdiction, arguing that it was necessary as "a bulwark against
488. See id. at 367.
489. The Court argued that "unlike the maximum hours laws, the licensing law
vested entirely arbitrary authority in the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to
grant or deny a laundryman permission to engage in his livelihood. See id. at 368.
This is not a completely persuasive explanation for the vote in ick We, however,
because the Yick Wo Court clearly was motivated in part by the obvious discrimina-
tory application of the licensing law, not simply by its arbitrariness. It is true that
the Yick Wo ordinance was more clearly discriminatory in its operation than were
the maximum hours laws, but San Francisco's attorney cited plausible nondiscrimi-
natory reasons why the Yick Wo ordinance only affected Chinese. See id. at 359.
Essentially, the city argued that only Chinese laundries had scaffolding on their
roofs and that this was a particular fire hazard. See id.
490. See MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 173-75.
491. See id.
492. See id. at 174-75.
493. See Holden, supra note 32, at 358-59.
494. 22 F. 701 (D. Or. 1885).
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local oppression and tyranny, as well 'up north' as 'down
south."'4 95 Without federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, he added,
the Fourteenth Amendment "would be a dead letter."496
Federal Ninth Circuit Judge Sawyer also regarded upholding
the rights of the Chinese as indispensable to the national
government's ability to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Wo Lee, Sawyer wrote:
[If, by an ordinance, general in its terms and form, like the
one in question, by reserving an arbitrary discretion in the
enacting body to grant or deny permission to engage in a
proper and necessary calling, a discrimination against any
class can be made in its execution, thereby evading and, in
effect, nullifying the provisions of the National Constitution,
then the insertion of provisions to guard the rights of every
class and person in that instrument was a vain and futile
act.497
Sawyer had little personal sympathy for the Chinese;498 yet, "[ilf
race hostility threatened federal promises of equal protection,
Sawyer felt called upon to act boldly as a representative of the
national government."499
495. Id. at 705.
496. Id.
497. In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 474 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886).
498. In private correspondence, Judge Sawyer stated:
The Chinese are vastly superior to the negro, but they are a race entire-
ly different from ours and never can assimilate and I don't think it de-
sirable that they should and for that reason I don't think it desirable
that they could come here. I think we made a mistake when we opened
our door of immigration to them.
FRrrZ, supra note 261, at 247. In an opinion invalidating a law prohibiting the Chi-
nese from being employed on public works, Judge Sawyer acknowledged that he be-
lieved that "an unlimited immigration of that people" was "unpleasant," "undesir-
able," and "ultimately dangerous to our civilization." In re Parrott, 1 F. 481, 518
(C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (Sawyer, J.).
499. Przybyszewski, supra note 260, at 46. Judge Deady forwarded a letter from
the governor of Oregon criticizing a pro-Chinese decision. See id. at 46-47. Sawyer
wrote to Deady:
He seems to think it presumnpt[ulous of a judge of the United States
Courts to perform the duties imposed upon him by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and examine into the question ... [wihether
this great state of Oregon... has in any way transcended its authority
as a member of this Union and in any way in any particular violated the
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While post-Civil War nationalism undoubtedly played a role in
the federal courts' decisions in the Chinese laundry cases, feder-
al decisions remained far more favorable to the Chinese in later
years, after federal authority over immigration and under the
Fourteenth Amendment was well-established.
Moreover, the fairness of federal judges toward the Chinese
was not limited to laundry cases. As Lucy Salyer points out,
Ninth Circuit judges hearing immigration cases in the 1890s
were not sympathetic personally to the Chinese; °° the judges'
"perceptions of their institutional obligations" led them to treat
the Chinese fairly.5"' The judges obviously felt institutional obli-
gations in the laundry cases as well. Unlike state judges, who
were protective of state authority, federal judges in the laundry
cases clearly believed that their primary duty was to enforce the
federal Constitution.
It also seems salient that the federal judges who decided the
Chinese laundry cases were appointed, not elected, and were
therefore largely insulated from majoritarian pressures. By
contrast, recall that most of the California Supreme Court justic-
es elected in 1879 were members of the virulently anti-Chinese
Workingman's Party.5 2 Anti-Chinese forces were able to capture
the state government, including the judiciary, but had far less
influence on the federal government.
The history of the Chinese laundry cases thus provides some
evidence to support Professor Neuborne's position that federal
courts will generally be more protective of federal constitutional
rights than will state courts because of federal judges' institu-
tional loyalties and insulation from democratic pressures.0 3
Constitution and laws of the United States to which it is subordinated.
Id. at 48.
500. See SALYER, supra note 63, at xvi.
501. Id.
502. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also LYDON, supra note 79, at
120-28 (giving an overview of the Workingman's Party).
503. One can argue that the Chinese cases and the Warren Court Era race cases
are similar in that they both involved a region deviating from national norms. West-
erners were especially hostile to the Chinese, and southerners were especially hostile
to blacks. This analysis begs the question, however, of why federal judges would be
more likely to enforce national norms than state judges. After all, federal judges
typically are from the state in which they sit, and therefore should share regional
[Vol. 41:211276
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While the history of Chinese laundry laws is not nearly enough
evidence to prove the universal applicability of Neuborne's in-
sights, it does show that federal courts have been superior pro-
tectors of federal constitutional rights outside the narrow con-
text of Warren and Burger Court activism.
IV. LOCHNER AND THE LAUNDRY CASES
Between Reconstruction and the New Deal, American courts
struggled with the issue of how much protection the Fourteenth
Amendment accorded to economic activity. In the Slaughter-
House Cases, 4 decided in 1873, a one-vote majority of the Su-
preme Court adopted a narrow reading of the Amendment. The
Court held that it was not entitled to interfere with state and
local economic regulations that did not explicitly discriminate
against African Americans." 5 The four dissenters, however,
argued vigorously that the Amendment gave courts wide author-
ity to invalidate legislation that violated traditional concepts of
economic liberty.
506
A significant percentage of federal and state courts implicitly
or explicitly rejected the Slaughter-House majority opinion in
favor of the dissent, and invalidated certain economic regula-
tions under the Fourteenth Amendment.507 Ultimately, in
Lochner, a one-vote majority of the Supreme Court accepted the
biases. Many federal judges, in fact, were active in local politics before ascending to
the bench.
504. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (upholding a law granting a monopoly to a
slaughterhouse); see also Durbridge v. Slaughterhouse Co., 27 La. Ann. 676 (1875)
(finding that the slaughterhouse had achieved its legal monopoly through bribery
and corruption).
505. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 69-72.
506. See id. at 89-111 (Field, J., dissenting), 111-24 (Bradley, J., dissenting), 124-30
(Swayne, J., dissenting).
507. Historians typically cite Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454 (II1. 1895) (invalidating
a law that limited women to a maximum of eight hours of daily factory labor),
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886) (invalidating a law requiring cash pay-
ment of wages), and In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885) (invalidating a law regulating
the production of cigars), but there are many other cases where the courts favored
the principles expressed in the Slaughter-House dissent over those of the majority.
See, e.g., Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499, 508 (1882); State v. Moore, 18 S.E. 342,
345 (N.C. 1893), overruled in part by State v. Hunt, 40 S.E. 216 (N.C. 1901).
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Slaughter-House dissenters' view that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment barred certain types of state economic regulation. 8
Despite the pre-New Deal Court's reputation for judicial activ-
ism, courts declared relatively few regulations unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment.50 9 Even after the Supreme
Court endorsed judicial protection of liberty of contract in
Lochner, the vast majority of state regulations were never chal-
lenged, and, of those that were challenged, only a small fraction
were invalidated.51 Nevertheless, the results of judicial over-
sight of economic regulations seemed sufficiently onerous to
"progressive" forces in the United States that they began to view
the courts,511 and even the Constitution itself,5" as serious obsta-
cles to their goals. Populists, Progressives, and labor activists
launched a vigorous propaganda offensive against Lochnerism
and the judges who upheld it. 13
Ultimately, the Supreme Court abandoned Lochnerism during
the New Deal. 14 With the triumph of New Deal statism, Lochner
became one of the most despised cases in Supreme Court histo-
ry, condemned by liberals and conservatives alike. For genera-
508. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
509. See Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court,
40 HARe. L. REV. 943, 944-45 (1927); Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the
United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 295 (1913).
510. See Michael J. Phillips, The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENT. U.
L. REV. 453, 453 (1998); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court
and Protective Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 SUP. CT. HIST. SockY Y.B. 53,
69-70; Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progres-
sive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63, 64 (1985).
511. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY 136-43 (1994) (describing Theodore
Roosevelt's attack on the federal judiciary during the 1912 presidential campaign).
512. See, e.g., George Gorham Groat, Economic Wage and Legal Wage, 33 YALE L.J.
489, 500 (1924) ("An eighteenth century constitution cannot, without change, be
fitted to these twentieth century conditions."). See generally Herman Belz, The Real-
ist Critique of Constitutionalism in the Era of Reform, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 288,
288 (1971) (noting that "scholars such as Woodrow Wilson, J. Franklin Jameson, and
Henry Jones Ford dissented from the reverential approval usually accorded the
American constitution" because they believed the Constitution did not adequately
address modem problems).
513. See generally ROSS, supra note 511 (providing a comprehensive study of the
Populist, Progressive, and labor union attack on Lochnerism and antiprogressive
judges).
514. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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tions, almost no law review writers, treatise authors, or histori-
ans had a good word to say about Lochnerian jurisprudence.515
Overwhelming hostility to Lochnerism continues today. Su-
preme Court justices consistently use Lochner as an epithet to
hurl at their colleagues when they disapprove of a decision de-
claring a law unconstitutional. For example, conservative Justic-
es accused their colleagues of Lochnerizing when the Court cur-
tailed abortion restrictions in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.516
Liberal Justices returned fire when the Court declared a proper-
ty regulation unconstitutional under the Takings Clause in
Dolan v. City of Tigard51 and when the Court used the Com-
merce Clause to invalidate a congressional edict in United States
v. Lopez.518
Animosity to Lochnerian jurisprudence has been based on
three underlying premises: first, that judicial protection of eco-
nomic liberties during the Lochner Era had no basis in the text
or history of the Constitution, but was instead a manifestation
of the reactionary political views of the judges involved; second,
that courts invalidated progressive legislation meant to rein in
corporate power and ameliorate the plight of the poor and vul-
nerable; and, third, that Lochnerism helped the wealthy and
powerful at the expense of the rest of society, especially the poor
and members of minority groups. Recent revisionist scholarship,
however, has challenged each of these suppositions.
The remainder of this Article uses the Chinese laundry litiga-
tion to illuminate the debate between traditional anti-Lochner
dogma and the new revisionist scholarship. In the years between
Slaughter-House and Lochner, Chinese laundry cases, along with
other cases involving challenges to anti-Chinese regulations,
were among the, most important vehicles through which judges
implicitly rejected the Slaughter-House majority opinion and
constructed a jurisprudence that protected economic liberties.51 9
515. See WILLIAM WiCEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 123 (1988) (finding that "Lochner has become in modern times a sort of nega-
tive touchstone").
516. 505 U.S. 833, 959-61 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
517. 512 U.S. 374, 405-11 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
518. 514 U.S. 549, 605-07 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
519. See generally Thomas Wuil Joo, New 'Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth
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These cases, while not necessarily definitive, provide the modern
scholar with excellent data to test the traditional and revisionist
theories.
A The Origins of Lochnerism
From the very day Lochner was decided through the present,
critics have argued that Lochner and related decisions had no
basis in the text or history of the Constitution, but that they
were instead based on the personal political preferences of the
justices.520 Many legal scholars and historians claim that these
predilections were based on the doctrines of Social Darwinism." 1
Amendment: Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases and the Development of
Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 353 (1995) (examining how
the chinese laundry cases contributed to 14th Amendment jurisprudence).
In some Chinese laundry cases, the courts explicitly cited the Slaughter-House
dissents to justify their opinions. See, e.g., In re Tie Loy, 26 F. 611, 613-14 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1886). In other cases, the courts used reasoning similar to the Slaughter-House
dissents, but failed to explicitly cite to those dissents, or even, in some cases, to the
Fourteenth Amendment, relying instead on the "supervisory power which judges
thought they were entitled to exercise over the actions of municipal corporations
under traditional common law principles." MCCLAIN, supra note 92, at 131.
520. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Lochner majority for deciding the case based "upon an economic theory
which a large part of the country does not entertain"); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 273 (1997)
("[Clourts substitute[ld their own views of policy for those of legislative bodies.");
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 36-49 (1990) (arguing that the Court had
no authority under the Constitution to invalidate economic legislation under the Due
Process Clause); EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 107-09 (1938)
(claiming that the original interpretation of the Due Process Clause was limited to
ensuring a fair trial for accused persons); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiS-
TRUST- A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14-21 (1980); PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN
FIELD 6 (1997) ("The Court's critics claimed that judges had constructed these the-
ories from thin air, that liberty of contract and substantive due process were not
based on the words of the Constitution . . . ."); Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Pater-
nalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921,
5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 250 (1987) (noting that Lochner "is still shorthand in con-
stitutional law for the worst sins of subjective judicial activism").
521. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 42 (3d ed.
1992); PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 228 (2d ed. 1983); RICHARD HOFSTADER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT 5-6 (rev. ed. 1955); CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE
COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS E. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND
JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (1954); PAUL KENS, JUDI-
CIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 5
1999] LOCHNER, PARITY, AND THE CHINESE LAUNDRY CASES 281
Others argue that Lochnerian jurisprudence was rooted in hos-
tility toward labor unions and favoritism toward large corpora-
tions.522 Recently, Cass Sunstein's claim that Lochnerian judges
(1990); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATITUDES
OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 236 (1960); BENJAMIN TwINS, LAWYERS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAME CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 154 (1942); MOR-
TON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMIERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 104
(1949); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, Part 11,
25 HARV. L. Rev. 489, 496-99 (1912).
The purported tie between Lochnerism and Social Darwinism seems to be based
on a misreading of Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner, and little else. Holmes fa-
mously wrote that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
A close reading of the context of the Social Statics remark reveals that Holmes was
arguing that the sic utere tuo ut alicnum non laedes principle--"use your own prop-
erty in such a manner as not to injure that of another"-could not be the basis of
American constitutional law. Holmes simply was using Spencer as an example of a
prominent intellectual who believed the sic utero principle should be the basis of
law. Holmes, however, was not accusing the Court of believing in Social Darwinism,
or of otherwise being influenced by Spencer, whose works Holmes had never read.
See PHILIP P. WIENER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM 173 (1965)
(noting that Holmes had never read Spencer).
John Gray has noted that it is unfair to caricature Spencer as a Social Darwin-
ist. See JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM 31 (1986). Spencer is more appropriately seen as a
classical liberal evolutionist whose views were perverted by Progressives who shared
his evolutionist methodology, but had illiberal political views. See id.
522. See BELL, supra note 521, at 35 ("Called upon to decide pressing questions
concerning the relations of labor and capital, the power of state legislatures, and the
rights of big business, the courts foreswore impartiality and came down heavily on
the side of economic interests."); ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION
135 (1987) (claiming the Supreme Court engaged in a "willful defense of wealth and
power"); CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 207
(1958) (criticizing 'judge-made constitutional doctrines supported by the conservative
groups of the country and fostered by the extreme individualism of leaders of indus-
try and finance ... "); JACOBS, supra note 521, at 24 ("The development of the
liberty of contract as a limitation upon the powers of both the state and the nation-
al governments was a judicial answer to the demands of industrialists in the period
of business expansion following the Civil War."); A.H. KELLY & W.H. HARBISON, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 498 (4th ed. 1970) (arguing
that Lochner-Era judges were "concerned primarily with protecting the property
rights and vested interests of big business," which manifested itself in the doctrine
of freedom of contract); ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERI-
CAN CAPITALISM 50, 57 (1968) (stating that courts protected economic activity from
adverse governmental regulation, based on principles and opinions that "are singular-
ly devoid of rational reasons for the decisions"); JOHN E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE
FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at
430-31 (1978) (noting the Supreme Court's "hostility to union activity" and to "laws
that encouraged unionism"); MELVIN UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITU-
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believed that "[miarket ordering under the common law was
understood to be a part of nature rather than a legal construct,"
and formed a "baseline from which to measure" the constitu-
tionality of state action5" has been very influential among legal
scholars. The historical basis of Sunstein's claim, however, is
extremely thin. In addition to Lochner itself, Sunstein cites only
five out of the hundreds of state and federal cases decided be-
tween Slaughter-House and the New Deal relevant to his thesis,
and even then misreads those cases from both a legal and eco-
nomic perspective.524
Revisionists, meanwhile, have argued that Lochnerian jurists
did not decide cases in a willfully political way, but genuinely
tried to enforce what they saw as the mandates of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Judges were confronted with a terribly
vague Amendment, which does not describe what is meant by
"privileges or immunities," "equal protection," or "due process."
Lochnerian judges did not define these phrases by reference to
the common law, the precepts of which were actually often used
to deny liberty of contract claims." Rather, Lochnerian judges
TIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 553-55 (1988) (attributing the Lochner deci-
sion to anti-union bias by the Supreme Court); WIECEI, supra note 515, at 121
(finding that the Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts "distrusted labor
organization[s]"); Robert L. Hale, Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual
Liberty, 15 AM. LAB. LEGAL REV. 155, 155 (1925) (arguing that the process of meet-
ing the burden of proof in cases challenging labor legislation weighs in favor of big
business).
523. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987).
524. The cases cited by Sunstein are West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923), Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), and Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908). See Sunstein, supra note 523, at 880-81. See generally
Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 382-83 (rejecting thesis that Lochnerian judges were
"formalists").
Contrary to Sunstein's assumption that the courts relied on the common law to
favor market ordering, common-law precepts were actually often used to deny liberty
of contract claims. See, e.g., Muller, 208 U.S. at 418-23; Patterson v. Bark Eudora,
190 U.S. 169, 173-79 (1903); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 368-74 (1898). More-
over, Sunstein assumes that laws establishing minimum wages and maximum hour
laws served to redistribute income to the poor. See Sunstein, supra note 523, at 880.
Minimum wage laws in fact price the unskilled out of the labor market to the bene-
fit of other workers, while maximum hours laws, by their very nature, do not redis-
tribute income, except perhaps among workers whose firms organize their labor
utilization differently.
525. See, e.g., Muller, 208 U.S. at 419; Holden, 169 U.S. at 397. The author thanks
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relied on two long-standing American intellectual traditions that
heavily influenced American conceptions of liberty and the prop-
er role of government in the post-bellum era:526 the tradition
that valued "natural rights" and "free labor,"52 and the tradition
that opposed "class legislation"-legislation that benefits politi-
cally powerful interest groups at the expense of other citizens.528
The Chinese laundry cases support the revisionist position.
There is no hint of Social Darwinism in the opinions invalidat-
ing laundry regulation, nor is there any intimation of pro-corpo-
ration or anti-union bias. Indeed, neither large corporations nor
labor unions were parties to any of the lawsuits. While labor
unions generally may have been virulently anti-Chinese, and
John Goldberg for raising this point.
526. See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-
1870, at 346-49 (1978); EARL M. MALTz, CIVIL RIGHS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CON-
GRESS, 1863-1869 (1990); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT- FROM
POLrITcAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).
527. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER,
1888-1910, at 77 (1995) (suggesting that natural law precepts, not Social Darwinism,
influenced Justice David Brewer, a prominent Supreme Court proponent of laissez-
faire ideology); KENS, supra note 520, at 7 (discussing Justice Field); Daniel R.
Ernst, Free Labor, the Consumer Interest, and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1885-
1900, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 19, 19 (1992) (stating that Lochner-Era judges "acted to
uphold a system of values which they termed the free labor system"); William E.
Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 767, 782-86 (noting courts' reliance on "free labor" ideology); Charles
W. McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered: Major Premises in the
Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 Sup. CT. HIST. SOCY Y.B. 20, 24-26 (arguing
that Lochner-Era judges viewed labor contracts as a special sort of contract because
of the dominant "free labor ideology"); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Anti-
slavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America,
87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 558-60 (1974).
528. See MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID J. BREWER. THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE, 1837-1910, at 120 (1994); HOwARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 33-45
(1993) (discussing the Jacksonian origins of laissez-faire jurisprudence); KENS, supra
note 520, at 7 (discussing Justice Field); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and
Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 293-94 (1985); Ely, supra note 10, at 46;
Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910:
A Legal and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 527 (1965); Charles W. McCurdy,
Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parame-
ters of Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 973-74
(1975); McCurdy, supra note 527, at 26; Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class
Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 248 n.211 (1997).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
corporations that needed labor were more Sinophilic, it would be
an unwarranted, even absurd, stretch to argue that Lochnerian
courts favored the Chinese laundrymen to aid corporations and
harm unions. In several of the pro-Chinese cases, in fact, judges
noted their objections to the laundry laws' tendency to drive out
small laundries and favor large corporate entities.529
Although pro-Chinese laundry decisions fail to reveal econom-
ic class bias, the opinions do illustrate courts' commitment to the
natural rights/free labor theory. For example, the Superior Court
of Alameda County invalidated a maximum hours law because
the law interfered "with the natural and inalienable right of
every individual... to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,
and to acquire, hold and enjoy property."3 ° Judge Sawyer, ob-
jecting to Stockton's laundry zoning law, wrote that the ordi-
nance violated the Fourteenth Amendment's right to labor, "one
of the highest privileges and immunities secured by the constitu-
tion to every American citizen, and to every person residing
within its protection.""' Sawyer found that another laundry
zoning ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it
"abridge[d] the liberty of the owner to select his own occupation
and his own methods in the pursuit of happiness, and thereby
prevent[ed] him from enjoying his rights, privileges, and immu-
nities, and deprive[d] him of equal protection of the laws."532
In In re Quong Woo,"a Justice Field objected to a laundry
licensing ordinance because San Francisco had placed unneces-
sary obstacles in the way of those who sought to pursue an ordi-
nary and useful trade.5" A city, Field added, may not use its li-
censing power "as a means of prohibiting any of the avocations
of life which are not injurious to public morals, nor offensive to
the senses, nor dangerous to the public health and safety."535
Finally, in Yick Wo, the Supreme Court analogized the unmiti-
529. See, e.g., In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 474 (1886).
530. In re Woo Yeck, 12 Pac. Coast L.J. 382, 383 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1883).
531. In re Tie Loy (The Stockton Laundry Case), 26 F. 611, 613 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886).
532. In re Sam Kee, 31 F. 680, 681 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
533. 13 F. 229 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
534. See id. at 233.
535. Id.
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gated discretion given to the San Francisco supervisors over
Chinese laundries to "the essence of slavery itself.""6
Judges also expressed their opposition to class legislation
when invalidating laundry laws. A San Francisco judge, for
example, invalidated a license fee because it was an "unequal
and discriminating" law that "discriminat[ed] unjustly against
the poor, wantonly and unnecessarily add[ed] to their burden,
and substantially prohibit[ed] them from the pursuit of a useful
and worthy calling."53 In a Montana case voiding a taxation
scheme that taxed Chinese-owned hand laundries far higher
than white-owned steam laundries, the court concluded that the
statute at issue was an unequal, discriminatory law that could
not be sustained under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause or the 1866 Civil Rights Act.538 In In re Quong
Woo, 53 9 Justice Field invalidated the laundry licensing ordi-
nance on the ground that a city's ordinances "must be reason-
able,--that is, not oppressive nor unequal nor unjust in their
operation."' Even the Supreme Court's Yick Wo opinion, often
regarded as a harbinger of modern equal protection doctrine,
was steeped in the language of the anti-class legislation tradi-
tion: "[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so
exclusively against a particular class of persons... with a mind
so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by
the State of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to
the petitioners."541
B. What Type of Regulations Did Lochnerian Courts Invalidate?
Legal scholars and historians have simply assumed that eco-
nomic legislation invalidated by Lochnerian courts was generally
wise regulation meant to protect consumers or workers as a
class from their inequality of bargaining power with increasingly
536. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
537. Chinese Laundry Ordinance, supra note 406, at 3 (publishing Judge Stanly's
opinion in People v. Soon Kung).
538. See In re Yot Sang, 75 F. 983, 985 (D. Mont. 1896), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Jurgens v. Yot Sang, 171 U.S. 686 (1898).
539. 13 F. 229 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
540. Id. at 232. -
541. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373.
286 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:211
rapacious corporations. 2 These views are based implicitly either
on old-fashioned Marxian class analysis or on Progressive opti-
mism about the role of government in regulating economic
affairs.
Revisionists, meanwhile, note that modern law and economics
scholarship has cast serious doubt on the proposition that "pro-
gressive" regulation in fact served the public interest. Public
choice theory suggests that much regulation inevitably serves
the cause of particular special interests, not the public as a
whole, while empirical studies of regulations typically find that
they harm consumers and workers.' As Jim Ely concludes: "[It
unfairly loads the historical deck to presume the benign purpose
and effect of so-called reform legislation." 5 Indeed, some revi-
542. See, e.g., PAUL, supra note 521, at 236. For early versions of this criticism, see
Louis M. Greeley, The Changing Attitude of the Courts Toward Social Legislation, 5
U. ILL. L. REV. 222, 226-32 (1910); Albert M. Kales, "Due Process," The Inarticulate
Major Premise and the Adamson Act, 26 YALE L.J. 519, 523 (1917); Thomas Reed
Powell, Collective Bargaining Before the Supreme Court, 33 P6L. SCL Q. 396, 397-429
(1918); Margaret Spahr, Natural Law, Due Process and Economic Pressure, 24 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 332, 332-54 (1930); cf. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSIINET,
REMNANTS OF BELIEF 149-50 ("Lochners critics pointed out that bakers 'chose' to
enter such contracts while caught in a social and economic setting that dictated a
particular outcome. Government intervention was justified to control private forces
that coerced workers and other vulnerable groups to act in certain ways."); James
W. Ely, Jr., Economic Due Process Revisited, 44 VAND. L. REV. 213, 213 (1991) ("In
many constitutional histories the presentation of economic issues between 1880 and
1937 resembles a Victorian melodrama. A dastardly Supreme Court is pictured as
frustrating noble reformers who sought to impose beneficent regulations on giant
business enterprises.").
543. See generally Christopher T. Wonnell, The Influential Myth of a Generalized
Conflict of Interests Between Labor and Management, 81 GEO. L.J. 39 (1992) (dis-
cussing the falsely perceived tension between labor and management).
544. Ronald Coase concluded that studies of regulation, published in the Journal of
Law and Economics,
tend to suggest that the regulation is either ineffective or that, when it
has a noticeable impact, on balance the effect is bad, so that consumers
obtain a worse product or a higher-priced product or both as a result of
the regulation. Indeed, this result is found so uniformly as to create a
puzzle: one would expect to find, in all these studies, at least some gov-
ernment programs that do more good than harm.
Ronald H. Coase, Economists and Public Policy, in LARGE CORPORATIONS IN A
CHANGING SOcIET= 169, 184 (J. Fred Weston ed., 1974); see also Bernard H. Siegan,
Separation of Powers & Economic Liberties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 415, 475 (1995)
(explaining that even if a regulation is based on good intentions, its final form may
not serve the interests of the public).
545. Ely, supra note 10, at 46 (finding that "much regulation has resulted in the
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sionists not only refuse to presume that reform legislation was
benign, but also contend that certain categories of regulation
strongly endorsed by progressives, including zoning,' licensing
laws, 547 protective laws for women,' and maximum hours
laws, 9 frequently worked to harm immigrants, women, and
members of racial minority groups.
The history of anti-Chinese laundry legislation provides fur-
ther evidence that much regulatory legislation was not wise or
humane, but anti-competitive and discriminatory. The use of
zoning laws, licensing laws, maximum hours laws, and protec-
tive laws for women to stifle the Chinese laundry business pre-
ceded the more general dissemination of such laws throughout
the country. Montana passed its first law protecting women
launderers from Chinese competitors in 1869, 5" decades before
Progressive activists began lobbying for protective legislation for
women workers. The earliest zoning laws were used to regulate
Chinese laundries, and these laws may have served as models
for later zoning.551 Maximum hours laws applicable to the pri-
vate sector seem to have been another regulatory innovation
used initially against Chinese laundries before being used more
reduction of economic efficiency, misallocation of resources, and redistribution of
income from the consumer to the regulated group").
546. See EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 114-15; Bernstein, Philip Sober, supra note 13,
at 862-64; Ely, supra note 3, at 958-60; Epstein, supra note 13, at 788-89; William
A. Fischel, Why Judicial Reversal of Apartheid Made a Difference, 51 VAND. L. REV.
975, 979-81 (1998).
547. See Bernstein, Licensing Laws, supra note 13, at 89.
548. See Bernstein, Note, supra note 13, at 736-37.
549. See EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 298; Bernstein, Note, supra note 13, at 729-33.
550. Amendment to Act Relative to Elections of 1865 § 6, 1870 Mont. Laws 55
(indicating that the laws only applied to male launderers, a class dominated by the
Chinese); Act Providing for the Collection of Revenue § 20, 1869 Mont. Laws 61.
551. As Gordon Whitnall wrote:
It must be granted that in those early days a laundry was almost synon-
ymous with Chinamen, and the [zoning] regulation was unquestionably a
move towards racial segregation. However, that purpose is not openly
stated, and now that the racial element is eliminated, we can look back
upon that early legislative act and find that the regulation it imposed, so
far as we can reconstruct the conditions that then prevailed and from
what we know of the city now, would be thoroughly in keeping with all
of the accepted practices of zoning.
Gordon Whitnall, History of Zoning, 155 ANNAIs AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 1, 9
(1931).
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widely. Licensing laws, although used against the Chinese in
San Francisco and Los Angeles in the 1880s, did not "achieve [I
a firm foothold in the statute-books of most American states"
until after 1890.552
This does not suggest that all economic regulations had dis-
criminatory intent and/or effects, but does indicate that the
growing state and local regulatory apparatuses of the late nine-
teenth century and early twentieth century drew not only on
reformist impulses, but also from a deep well of prejudice and
exclusionary sentiment. Moreover, to the extent that the Chi-
nese laundry cases influenced judicial attitudes toward regula-
tion and contributed to the development of Lochnerian jurispru-
dence, the courts had good reasons to develop doctrines that
ensured that regulatory legislation was truly public-spirited and
not "passed from other motives."5"
C. Who Did Lochnerian Jurisprudence Help?
Traditionally, legal scholars and historians have accused
Lochnerian courts of "an unadorned endorsement of the strong
and wealthy at the expense of the weak and poor."5" Liberty of
contract, a typical jeremiad proclaims, "meant freedom of the
rich to impose terms.'"5 5 According to one prominent legal histo-
rian, "[tihe result in Lochner was that the Constitution was
virtually treated as a legal sanction of the Survival of the Fit-
test."556 Derrick Bell even purports to find an implicit connection
between Lochnerian ideology and racism. 7
Revisionists, by contrast, note that Lochnerian courts never
invalidated widows' pensions, poor laws, or other legislation that
clearly redistributed wealth to the poor.55 Rather, the courts,
552. Friedman, supra note 528, at 489.
553. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
554. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 4, at 84.
555. WIECEK, supra note 515, at 126 (quoting "the comparable and contemporane-
ous English doctrine").
556. BERNARD SCHWARTz, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 202 (1993).
557. See Derrick Bell, Does Discrimination Make Economic Sense?, HUM. RTS., Fall
1988, at 38, 41-42.
558. See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the
New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1362 n.17 (1983).
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consistent with anti-class legislation and free labor ideology,
opposed both legislation that seemed to redistribute wealth from
the public at large to a special interest group, and legislation
that seemed to interfere unreasonably with occupational free-
dom. The people who benefitted most from Lochnerian jurispru-
dence were those least capable of defending their interests in the
political process: poor and disenfranchised aliens, women, and
blacks.559 Lochnerian jurisprudence, however, was too tepid and
was applied far too inconsistently to be of great aid to political
outsiders. 60
Once again, the Chinese laundry cases support the
revisionists' point of view. Appeals to Lochnerism were the Chi-
nese litigants' only recourse against facially neutral legislation
passed with discriminatory intent. Courts rejected notions akin
to modern equal protection doctrine requiring courts to invali-
date laws passed with discriminatory intent if the laws have
discriminatory effects.561
In Soon Hing v. Crowley,562 for example, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that a regulatory statute could be declared
unconstitutional for discriminating against a minority group
only if the language of the statute was explicitly discriminato-
ry s or if "in its enforcement it is made to operate only against
the class mentioned."5 6 More subtle discriminatory effects
and/or discriminatory motives not apparent from the language of
the statute would not render a law unconstitutional.5 65 This
remained the law well into the twentieth century. In a 1916
laundry case, for example, a federal judge, who was otherwise
559. See Bernstein, Note, supra note 13, at 736-37.
560. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 108 (Lochner stood for small (but
not small enough) government."); Bernstein, Law and Economics, supra note 13, at
838-39 ("[O]ppressed African-Americans were often the victims of too little judicial
hostility to regulation, not too much.").
561. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
562. 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
563. See id. at 710.
564. Id. at 711 (emphasis added).
565. See id.; see also Chinese Laundry Ordinance, supra note 406, at 3 (publishing
Judge Stanly's opinion in People v. Soon Kung, where Judge Stanly wrote that the
"suggestion has been made that the order was intended to apply primarily to a race
of persons not expressly designated in it. However that may be, this Court has noth-
ing to do with the secret motives or intentions of the body which passed the order").
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sympathetic to the Chinese plaintiff's claim, stated that a law
passed with discriminatory motives did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause if the law is fair on its face and capable of im-
partial application.66
Although claims of anti-Chinese discrimination were generally
unavailing,56 courts that applied Lochnerian principles to anti-
Chinese laundry laws almost always invalidated such laws. By
contrast, when courts instead deferred to the states' police pow-
er, they almost always upheld the oppressive laws.
The importance of Lochnerism to protecting Chinese laundry-
men can be seen from a review of several cases involving chal-
lenges to maximum hours statutes. In Soon Hing, the Court
rejected the argument that such a law violated the right of
workers to choose their hours of labor. 68 According to the Court,
laws regulating the hours of labor, rather than being class legis-
lation or violations of free labor principles, "have always been
deemed beneficent and merciful laws, especially to the poor and
dependent, to the laborers in our factories and workshops and in
the heated rooms of our cities; and their validity has been sus-
tained by the highest courts of the States."569
Just twenty years later, in Lochner, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a maximum hours laws that applied only to bakery work-
ers. ° The Court held that the law was not within the police
power because baking was not a particularly unhealthful occupa-
tion.57 1 The law, the Court argued, was not passed to protect the
public health or the health of bakers, but was class legislation
passed for "other motives."7 2 The Court concluded that the
hours law violated the right of workers to negotiate their condi-
tions of labor under the Fourteenth Amendment.7
566. See Yee Gee v. City of San Francisco, 235 F. 757, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1916); see
also Ex parte San Chung, 105 P. 609, 611 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1909).
567. But see Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63 (1912) (noting the statute
would be unconstitutional if found to be discriminating); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (invalidating laundry regulation because it applied solely to the
Chinese).
568. See Soon Hing, 113 U.S. at 710-11.
569. Id. at 710.
570. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905).
571. See id. at 64.
572. Id.
573. See id. at 58.
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The Court's reversal on this issue led to salutary results for
Chinese laundrymen. In Yee Gee v. City of San Francisco," 4 a
federal district court invalidated a -San Francisco maximum
hours law for laundries. 75 As discussed above, the court relied
heavily on Lochner in its decision.5 6 The court concluded that
the maximum hours law was "an unreasonable interference with
the liberty of the citizen in the prosecution of his occupation,"
and had "no real or substantial relation" to any purported public
purpose."' As with the kindred regulation in Lochner, the mu-
nicipality passed the laundry law under the pretense of being a
police power regulation, but the law was "'in reality passed from
other motives."'5 78 Similarly, in In re Mark,579 the California
Supreme Court found that Oakland's laundry hours law was
unconstitutional under Lochner and like-minded cases.580
These maximum hours cases demonstrate the utility of
Lochnerian jurisprudence for disenfranchised minorities and
others without power in the political system. Courts adhering to
either Lochnerism or modern equal protection doctrine would
have invalidated the statute at issue in Soon Hing because it
had blatantly discriminatory origins and obvious discriminatory
effects, and interfered with liberty of contract. Unlike Loch-
nerism, however, modern equal protection notions would not
have helped the laundrymen in Yee Gee, as the statute at issue
in that case was passed primarily to aid members of a labor
union, not to harm the Chinese. Nor would modern equal protec-
tion doctrine have aided Byron Mark, unless he had been able to
prove that the law under which he was charged had discrimina-
tory origins and effects, neither of which could have been obvi-
ous to the court. As Richard Epstein points out, "[ilt is far easier
to control government abuse by enforcing the constitutional
limitations on legislative power in the first instance" than by
"try[ing] to filter out the discriminatory uses from the legitimate
ones."
581
574. 235 F. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
575. See id. at 769.
576. See supra notes 196-216 and accompanying text.
577. Yee Gee, 235 F. at 767.
578. See id. at 768 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64).
579. 58 P.2d 913 (Cal. 1936).
580. See id. at 916.
581. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 115.
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By policing the legislative process to prohibit special interest
legislation and legislation interfering with a free labor market,
Lochnerian courts protected the disenfranchised from regula-
tions that neglected their interests. The significance of this pro-
tection should not be underestimated. Between aliens, blacks,
foreign-born Asians, and until passage of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment, women in some states, a huge percentage of the American
population was incapable of defending itself in the legislative
process. Moreover, public choice theory suggests that voting
citizens who belong to dispersed majorities often suffer at the
hands of concentrated special interest groups that wield dispro-
portionate political power. Contrary to traditional assumptions,
many of the conflicts that reached the courts during the Lochner
Era did not primarily involve laws that protected workers
against businessmen or consumers against corporations. Rather,
the laws at issue pitted organized workers against unorganized
workers, large corporations with political influence against up-
starts, and special interests against the public at large.
One response to this revisionist viewpoint is to assert that
Lochnerian decisions protecting disenfranchised minorities were
largely irrelevant because hostile majorities were typically able
to achieve their goals through violence, intimidation, boycotts,
and discrimination not supported by state action." 2 The Chinese
laundry cases, however, provide an example in which Loch-
nerism made a difference. Protected by federal and some state
courts from much of the discriminatory legislation targeting
them, Chinese laundries thrived throughout the West, even in
cities where they faced organized boycotts, including Butte,5"
582. See Michael J. Kiarman, Race and the Supreme Court in the Progressive Era,
51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 939 (1998).
583. Boycotts of the Chinese in Butte, Montana during the mid-1880s and early
1890s proved fruitless. See Frisch, supra note 78, at 169-70, 174, 176-77. A more
serious boycott of Chinese laundries in late 1896 started after the Yot Sang court
declared Montana's new laundry law unconstitutional. See Flaherty, supra note 78,
at 36. The proprietors of three leading steam laundries, the Hotel and Restaurant
Keepers, and the Cooks and Waiters' union led the boycott. After a titanic struggle,
the boycott failed. See id. at 46-47. Between 1895 and 1900, the number of Chinese
laundries in Butte grew from 18 to 31. See Lee, supra note 47, at 51. The number
of white-owned laundries, meanwhile, declined from 11 to 9, and declined further to
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Chico,5 Helena,585 Los Angeles,"8 6 Prescott,587 and Salt Lake
City. 588
Another response to the revisionist viewpoint is that the pro-
tection of despised and disenfranchised groups was frequently a
fortuitous byproduct of Lochnerism's hostility to special interest
legislation rather than a conscious decision by the courts to
protect these groups. This point should be readily conceded; as
5 by 1905, even though the Chinese still ran 31 laundries. See id. at 53.
584. Anti-Chinese forces launched an unsuccessful boycott of laundries in Chico,
California in 1877. See Shover, supra note 78, at 233.
585. On January 27, 1866, a Helena newspaper published a notice, signed by "A
Committee of Ladies," complaining about "Mongolian hordes" who were driving white
women out of the laundry business. John R. Wunder, Law and Chinese in Frontier
Montana, MONT.: MAG. W. HIST., Summer 1980, at 18, 20. The committee called on
the community to boycott all Chinese launderers. See id. The editor of the newspa-
per in which the ad appeared wrote that the committee had his support "against
the almond-eyed citizens of the John persuasion,'" and asked local residents to sup-
port the boycott. Id. (quoting T.J. Favorite, the editor of the Montana Radiator in
an article appearing in the newspaper on January 24, 1866). The boycott failed. See
id.
586. Labor unions launched a boycott of Chinese businesses, including laundries, in
1886. See Lou, Chinese-American Agricultural Workers, supra note 78, at 57. The
boycott failed miserably, largely because of the opposition of white middle class
women. See id. at 58. These women sympathized with the Chinese and also appreci-
ated the fact that the Chinese undertook many domestic chores, such as laundering,
that the women would otherwise have had to do themselves. See id. at 49, 58. The
number of Chinese laundries in Los Angeles grew from 11 in 1872 to 52 in 1890.
See id. at 307 n.9.
587. In 1878, the Enterprise, a local newspaper, called for a boycott of Chinese
laundries. See Lister & Lister, supra note 43, at 53-54. The newspaper editorialized:
"'As washermen, they have never had any mercy on white men and women's cloth-
ing ... Why, then, not start one or two steam laundries here, white laboring men
and women, and earn the money that now goes into heathen handsT" Id. at 54. Two
white women started a hand laundry, but it failed. See id. In 1886, at the height of
anti-Chinese sentiment in the West, and with rioting throughout the West, a group
of citizens organized an Anti-Chinese League. See id. at 57-59. Among its ventures
was a new business called the "White Laundry." Id. at 61. Still, the Chinese laun-
dries survived, and even thrived. In 1900, an advertisement in a local newspaper
placed by a white laundry owner appealed to anti-Chinese sentiment in an attempt
to win customers:
Do the Chinese support the schools: Nit! Do the chinks spend their mon-
ey where they make it? Nein! Are they a credit to the country or an
honor to the town? Nixey! Then why not send your clothes to a white
institution? Hey? The Prescott Steam Laundry invites your patronage. D.
M. Clark, Proprietor.
Id. at 71.
588. See Daniel Liestman, Utah's Chinatown, 63 UTAH HIST. Q. 70 (1996).
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noted previously, for example, many of the judges that ruled in
favor of the Chinese had a rather low opinion of them. But the
fact that judges who despised the Chinese nevertheless protected
their occupational liberty is actually part of Lochnerism's allure.
Lochnerian free labor and anti-class legislation doctrines pro-
vided neutral principles that shielded groups such as the Chi-
nese from harmful legislation without relying on judges to rise
above the prejudices of their society.
CONCLUSION
Legal theory too often relies on understandings of legal histo-
ry based on myth and speculation, as opposed to empirical his-
torical evidence, including evidence gleaned from relevant cases.
For example, the debate over whether Neuborne's anti-parity
thesis relies too heavily on the anomalous Warren Court Era
has involved much speculation but little historical investigation.
Careful study of the Chinese laundry cases reveals that, consis-
tent with the anti-parity view, federal courts have at least some-
times been superior guardians of federal constitutional rights
outside the narrow context of the Warren Court Era.
The laundry cases also provide evidence that the entrenched
theories regarding the origins and effects of Lochnerian jurispru-
dence are mistaken. Investigation of the laundry cases supports
the thesis. Lochnerism originated not in reactionary politics or
judicial commitment to common-law baselines, but in judicial
commitment to free labor principles and judicial opposition to
class legislation. Moreover, the laundry cases suggest, consistent
with revisionist scholarship, that laws invalidated by Lochnerian
courts were not the universally wise, public-spirited legislation
of legal-historical myth. Rather, they were often special interest
legislation that harmed the most defenseless elements of society.
Finally in the context of Chinese laundry cases, as in other con-
texts, Lochnerian decisions did not systematically favor the rich
over the poor, but favored the politically humble over the politi-
cally powerful. In short, this Article adds to the growing litera-
ture suggesting that the redistributive effects of Lochnerism
were far more egalitarian than legal scholarship has typically
acknowledged.
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